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Abstract
The so-called gossip problem is a formal model of peer-to-peer communica-
tion. In order to perform such communication efficiently, it is important to keep
track of what agents know about who holds what information at a given point in
time. The knowledge that the agents possess depends strongly on the particular
type of communication that is used.
Here, we formally define a large number of different variants of the gossip
problem, that differ in the extent to which communication is private (observable,
synchronous or asynchronous), the direction of the flow of information (caller to
callee, callee to caller or both) and whether the agents become aware of the exact
set of information possessed by their communication partner.
We consider a number of formulas that represent interesting properties that a
gossip situation may or may not enjoy, and show for which variants they are valid.
Additionally, we show that the model checking and validity checking problems for
each variant are decidable, and we introduce sound and complete proof systems
for them.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Gossip Problem
The gossip problem [36, 10, 25] models the spread of information through peer-to-peer
communication. In the gossip problem, there is a set Ag of agents of size |Ag| = n,
each of which starts with a private piece of information that is referred to as that agent’s
secret. An agent who knows the secrets of every agent is called an expert. The agents’
goal is to share information in such a way that they all become experts, and to do so as
efficiently as possible. In order to achieve this goal, the agents communicate using one-
to-one interactions, usually referred to as telephone calls or simply calls. Importantly,
when agents communicate they transmit not only their own secret, but also all other
secrets that they have learned. So if in the first call agent a tells b its secret, then in a
subsequent call between b and c, b will tell c the secrets of both a and b.
The gossip problem is usually represented by the metaphor of a number of peo-
ple exchanging secrets by gossiping over the phone. It is applicable far beyond this
metaphor, however, and provides a way to study any dissemination of information in
distributed environments. In order to represent the many different ways to communi-
cate, we do have to make some small modifications to the gossip problem based on the
particular communication method that we wish to model. For example, in some cases
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the caller tells all its secrets to the callee without hearing anything in return, while in
other cases both caller and callee tell their secrets. This way a large number of different
variants of the gossip problem can be defined, one for each way to communicate.
The first wave of papers about the gossip problem was published in the 1970s and
1980s by Tijdeman, Baker, Hajnal and many others [36, 10, 23, 13, 35]. These papers
typically focused on establishing, for a given variant, the minimum number of calls
needed to turn all agents into experts. In the most commonly studied variant, where
both agents in a call tell each other all the secrets they know, the minimum number of
calls is 2n− 4, assuming that n ≥ 4 [36, 10, 23].
Unfortunately, the solutions where all agents become experts after 2n− 4 calls are
very hard, and sometimes even impossible, to achieve in a distributed setting. This
is because such solutions require a large amount of coordination. If there is a central
authority that instructs each agent who to call and when to do so, then 2n − 4 can be
achieved. But in a distributed system such a central authority is typically absent (one
could even argue that, by definition, a distributed system lacks such a central authority).
Without anyone telling them exactly what to do, the agents are left to do the best they
can based on their (possibly rather limited) knowledge of the situation. Often, the
agents cannot coordinate sufficiently to make everyone experts in 2n− 4 calls.
The failure to reach a sufficiently high level of coordination for the 2n− 4 solution
has lead to many papers on the gossip problem where calls are made randomly [19,
22, 27, 25, 28], and more recently to a new wave of papers on the gossip problem that
study epistemic protocols [6, 1, 37, 7, 26, 3, 40, 4, 17]. A protocol, in this context, is
simply a list of instructions of the form “if the condition ϕab is true, agent a should call
agent b”. Because agents need to base their actions on their knowledge, not all such
instructions can be carried out, however. If a doesn’t know whether the condition ϕab
holds, it cannot determine whether it should call b. A protocol is epistemic if the agents
can obey their instructions, so if whenever ϕab is true, a knows that ϕab is true.
An epistemic protocol can only depend on things that the agents know, so in order
to design such a protocol we first have to determine which things the agents know. This
task is complicated by the fact that what agents know depends on the type of commu-
nication that is used, so the agents’ knowledge depends on the specific variant of the
gossip problem that we are considering. For example, take the following protocol, in
the commendable survey by Hedetniemi et al. [25] mentioned as the protocol NOHO,
for ‘No One Hears Own’:
Tell new secrets (TNS)
Agent a may call agent b if b doesn’t know a’s secret.
So the condition ϕab is given by “b doesn’t know a’s secret.” Note that there may be
multiple pairs (a, b) for which the condition ϕab holds. In that case, there are multiple
calls that are possible. Which of these possible calls actually happens is considered to
be non-deterministic.
In most gossip variants, TNS is not an epistemic protocol, since a typically cannot
be certain that b doesn’t know a’s secret. After all, once a tells its secret to anyone
else, a loses control of where it spreads; if a tells its secret to c, then c might tell it to
d who might tell it to b. But suppose now that the agents are using a communication
type where the meta-data of each call is public, i.e., where every agent can see exactly
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who has called whom. In that variant, a can keep track of where its secret has spread:
if a tells its secret to c who tells it to b, then a will see that the cb call has taken place.
So, in particular, whenever b doesn’t know a’s secret, a knows this. The protocol TNS
is therefore epistemic in this variant, even if it is non-epistemic in most other variants.
There are a number of protocols that are epistemic in every variant of the gossip
problem. Consider, for example, the variant of TNS known as hear my secret [1]:
Hear my secret (HMS)
Agent a may call agent b unless a knows that b knows a’s secret,
and the protocol learn new secrets [6]:
Learn new secrets (LNS)
Agent a may call agent b if a doesn’t know b’s secret.
The protocols HMS and LNS are epistemic regardless of the type of communication.
Furthermore, they are strongly successful, i.e., they are guaranteed to terminate and to
turn all agents into experts. Unfortunately, they are not very fast: both HMS and LNS
require, in the worst case, quadratically many calls, and are likely to have the same the
n log n expectation as the protocol of just making random calls [32, 38]. It is unclear
whether we can do substantially better than an n log n expected termination, but it
seems conceivable that more efficient epistemic protocols might result by exploiting
the specific properties of knowledge in gossip protocols. This requires great precision
on the notion of knowledge, including its computational aspects.
Understanding the properties of knowledge in gossip protocols, and ax-
iomatizing such logics, is the main subject of this paper.
1.2 Our contribution
Let us now describe in some detail how we will model the properties of knowledge in
gossip, how we will address some computational issues of decidability, and what the
novelties are of our axiomatizations.
We start by formally defining 3 parameters that lead to 18 different variants of
the gossip problem We then discuss a number of properties, such as perfect recall,
that some variants have but others do not (Proposition 3.11). We also show that the
model checking and validity checking problems for each variant are decidable (Theo-
rem 3.20). An important consequence of this decidability is that the problems of pro-
tocol termination and success (i.e., will every agent know all secrets when the protocol
terminates) are also decidable. Finally, we provide axiomatizations for all variants.
The variants that we discuss differ in three parameters.
Firstly, there is the level of privacy that a call enjoys. The lowest level of privacy
is the one that we described above, where the meta-data of each call is public. An
intermediate level of privacy is if the communication is synchronous, i.e., if all agents
notice it when a call happened but they don’t know the identity of the two agents
involved. This is the most commonly investigated level of privacy in the distributed
computing community of gossip protocols, where calls are made in rounds. A round
is such a moment of synchronization, sometimes of multiple calls, but in our setting of
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sequential gossip every round consists of a single call. At the highest level of privacy
calls are asynchronous, so the agents are completely unaware of any calls they are not
involved in.
Secondly, we distinguish different variants with respect to the direction of commu-
nication. Calls can be of the type push where the caller tells its secrets to the callee,
of the type pull where the callee tells its secrets to the caller or of the type push-pull
where both agents tell each other their secrets.
Finally, we distinguish communication where agents tell their partner all secrets,
from communication where agents tell only those secrets that their partner does not yet
know. We refer to this final parameter as the level of observance.
In Section 2 we discuss the three parameters in more depth, and define the lan-
guage that we use to reason about the knowledge of agents is gossip situations. Fol-
lowing that, in Section 3, we define the models that describe the various types of gossip
problem, and use them to define the semantics for the language. In Section 3 we also
discuss the first few results about the differences between the variants, and prove the
decidability of model checking and validity checking. In the main Sections 4–6 we in-
troduce axiomatizations for knowledge in all 18 variants, using a modular proof system
that contains so-called reduction axioms. Before all of that, however, we first mention
some background and related work, which we will also recall in greater technical detail
in the final concluding Section 7.
1.3 Related Work
In this subsection we investigate the gossip literature, some of which was already men-
tioned in the previous subsection, in greater detail.
The gossip problem constitutes an excellent model to study information dissemi-
nation in distributed environments. The literature in distributed protocols has therefore
taken up the problem and analyzed it together with a wealth of variations including
different communication primitives (e.g., broadcasting instead of one-to-one calls), as
well as communication structures (networks), faulty communication channels [14] and
probabilistic information transmission, where the spreading of gossips is used to model
the spread of epidemics [9, 34]. Surveys are [22, 27, 25, 28].
Epistemic protocols can be carried out by agents in a distributed system, so they
are distributed protocols. More specifically, their reliance on the knowledge of agents
makes epistemic protocols examples of so-called knowledge-based protocols as stud-
ied in distributed systems [33, 30, 24, 21]. Such distributed systems have also been
object of study from the perspective of epistemic logic [20, 31], which has provided a
useful level of abstraction from which to address a number of problems related to dis-
tributed computing and communication [33, 30, 21], such as protocols for the sequence
transmission problem [24].
Of the publications on epistemic protocols, Attamah et al. [6] modeled a syn-
chronous setting wherein all agents know whether a call took place, although if they
are not involved in that call they may not know between whom the call took place. In
that paper its authors also modeled the semantics of calls in dynamic epistemic logic
[39], with reduction properties for knowledge after calls that are similar to the ones we
propose in this work. Apt et al. [1] study the purely distributed setting, where agents
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are unaware of any calls that they are not directly involved in. Additionally, [1] mod-
eled three different directions of communication: the caller and callee tell each other
their secrets (push-pull), the caller tells the callee their secrets but does not hear any
secrets in return (push) or the callee tells the caller their secrets (pull). The paper also
discusses gossip protocols for specific networks, like the ‘Ring Protocol’, for the circu-
lar gossip graph wherein agents can only call their left and right neighbors. Gossip can
also be seen as an instance of multi-agent epistemic planning. In [16], this was studied
using the planning language PDDL.
Herzig and Maffre [26] studied gossip protocols where the aim was not merely to
turn everyone into experts (level 1 shared knowledge), but also to achieve that every-
body knows that everyone is an expert (level 2 shared knowledge), and so on: higher-
order knowledge of the fact that everyone is an expert (level k shared knowledge).
They presented a protocol that achieves k-level shared knowledge in (k + 1)(n − 2)
steps. It should be noted that this requires that not only secrets are exchanged in mes-
sages but also knowledge, including higher-order knowledge, of secrets. Without that,
level 2 shared knowledge can still be achieved but it seems unlikely that level k shared
knowledge, for k > 2, can then be achieved.
Van Ditmarsch et al. [41, 40] present studies of dynamic gossip protocols, where
in calls the agents not only share their secrets but also the set of their neighbours, i.e.,
their network links to other agents. The purpose of these works is to characterize such
protocols in terms of the class of graphs for which they terminate. In turn, in [37] the
gossip problems are presented in an epistemic framework that provides several param-
eters allowing one to capture such aspects as the initial knowledge of the agents, the
type of communication used (such as the above direction of the information exchange:
pushpull, push, and pull), and the desired type of the protocol. For some of the com-
binations of the parameters the minimum number of calls needed to reach the final
situation is then established. In [38] it is investigated which distributions of secrets
can be reached by particular epistemic gossip protocols, and reports on simulations,
calculations, and (information theoretical) approximations of expected protocol execu-
tion time, including achieving the O(n log n) expected complexity of termination for
various other protocols than the one where all calls are random.
The papers most directly related to this one are [37], [2] and a series of papers
by Apt and Wojtczak [3, 4, 5]. In [37], some of the key information assumptions on
calls were identified—most notably assumptions about synchrony/asynchrony. A main
other topic in that publication was the minimum number of calls under different con-
ditions of coordination. In [2] the difference between synchronous and asynchronous
communication was also discussed, along with two more parameters: direction (push,
pull or push-pull) and observance (before or after).1 We consider the same set of pa-
rameters as in [2], and several of the definitions we use in this paper are also identical
to the ones in [2]. The papers [3], [4] and [5] also build upon the definitions of [2]
but use a more restricted set of parameters. Specifically, they vary only the direction
of the call (push, pull or pushpull) while leaving the levels of privacy and observance
constant.2 Furthermore, they only consider the depth 1 fragment of epistemic logic.
1See Section 2 for definitions of synchrony, call direction and observance.
2Using the notation introduced in Section 2, [3, 4, 5] consider only the call types ( , d, α).
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This means that a call condition ϕab cannot depend on higher order knowledge. So, for
example, a call condition where a can call b if a knows that b doesn’t know whether
c knows a’s secret is not allowed in that setting. For this restricted set of parameters
and this fragment of the language, [3] and [4] show that the model and satisfiability
checking problems are decidable. They also establish several computational complex-
ity results for those problems and a number of related problems. In [5] a number of
open questions regarding epistemic gossip are introduced.
The decidability results proven in this paper extend the ones from [3, 4] by con-
sidering the full set of parameters introduced in [2], as opposed to varying only the
direction of calls, and considering the full language, as opposed to only the depth 1
fragment. Interestingly, considering the full language also makes the difference be-
tween the three directions much more pronounced; the proofs in [3, 4] for the three
directions are completely analogous, while our results for push-pull differ significantly
from our results for push and pull. (See Section 5 for details.) We also consider ar-
bitrary starting situations for gossip, while [3, 4, 5] only consider the unique starting
situation where it is common knowledge that every agent initially only knew its own
secret. Finally, we introduce axiomatizations for each variant of the gossip problem,
thereby answering the first two open questions from [5]. Along the way we also show
that common knowledge does not reduce to nested knowledge, see Remark 5.9, which
answers the third open question from [5].
2 Preliminaries and Syntax
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set Ag of at least three agents. We
assume that each agent has exactly one secret and that the secrets are pairwise different.
Each secret is viewed as a distinct symbol. We denote by S the set of all secrets and
the secret of agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B and so on. If agent a has found
out the secret B of b, we say that a is familiar with B, and write FaB.
Furthermore, we assume that each secret carries information identifying the agent
to whom this secret belongs. So once agent a learns secretB she knows that she learned
the secret of agent b. An agent is familiar with their own secret and all the secrets they
learned by making calls.
2.1 Calls
Calls constitute the sole form of knowledge acquisition the agents have to their dis-
posal. In its abstract form, a call c is a pair of agents ab (with a 6= b). Each call
concerns four roles, caller, callee, informer and listener (we will come back to these
roles shortly). The agents a and b with a 6= b that constitute call c are denoted by
Ag(c) = {a, b}. Any agent c different from a and b is called an outsider of the call.
Our account of calls takes into account various aspects of them, namely:
• privacy, which is concerned with what outsiders note about the call,
• direction, which clarifies the direction of the information flow in the call,
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• observance, which clarifies, when an agent a is informed by b, whether a sees
b’s secrets before fusing them with her own, or only sees the result of the fusion
of the two sets of secrets.
Each of the choices for the above parameters constitutes a call type τ . More for-
mally, a call type τ = (p, d, o) where, in each type, the parameter p ranges over
P = { , , } and is called the privacy level, or simply privacy, d ∈ D = {3, /, .}, is
called the direction type (or direction) of the call, and o ∈ O = {α, β}, is called the
observance level (or observance). Often, the call type (or parts of it) is (are) clear from
the context, and we omit it (them). In our examples, at the level of calls, we often only
explicitly mention the direction type, and they may be written infix, i.e., a . b means
ab ., etc. For a type τ like ( ,3, β), we define τ(p) = , τ(d) = 3, etc. Note we have
now defined 18 different types of calls.
In theory, it would be possible for different call types to be combined; a call of type
( ,3, α) could be followed by a call of type ( , ., β). We are not aware of anyone
studying such mixed call types, however, nor do we consider mixing call types to be
particularly useful. We therefore consider the call type to be a global parameter, i.e., in
any given situation we consider the call type to be fixed.
If Ag(call) = {a, b}, the privacy type determines the extent to which an agent
c 6∈ {a, b} notices call taking place.
• : every agent c, even those c 6= a, b, notes that c happens,
• : every agent c 6= a, b notes that some call takes place, though not between
whom,
• : no agent c 6= a, b notes that a call is taking place.
We refer to any call type τ with τ(p) ∈ { , } as a synchronous call, while τ(p) =
denotes the asynchronous case. Intuitively, those degrees can be ordered as <p
<p , with meaning no privacy at all, and denoting full privacy. Conversely,
from the perspective of the agents not involved in the call, a call with privacy level is
the most informative, while calls of privacy level are the most opaque.
Next, we distinguish three direction types, in short directions, of a call:
• push-pull, written as 3.
As a result of the call a3b the caller a and the callee b learn each other’s secrets
(and they each play the role of informer and listener).
• push, written as ..
As a result of the call a . b, the callee b learns all the secrets held by the caller a.
Agent b is the listener, a the informer.
• pull, written as / .
As a result of the call a / b, the caller a learns all the secrets held by the callee b.
Agent b is the informer, a the listener.
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The directions . and / have many properties that are ‘symmetric’, but there is
one important distinction. Regardless of the direction type, it is always the caller who
initiates a call. So in a call a . b agent a decides to give information to b, while in a call
a . b agent a decides to take information from b. In this paper, that difference does not
come up much, since we are interested in modeling the information effects of calls, and
the information gained by a and b in a.b is exactly the same as that gained in b / a. But
remember that our goal is to use the agents’ knowledge to define an epistemic gossip
protocol. In such a protocol, every call has a call condition, and a call can be placed if
the caller knows that this condition holds. So for the call a . b to happen agent a must
know that the condition holds, while for the call b / a it is b that must know it.
Depending on the direction of a call between a and b there are one or two agents
who can learn new secret, although both agents may learn new information: for a . b
for instance, b learns all of a’s secrets, and a learns that b has learned them. Given a
direction d, we denote the set of calls with that direction as Cd.
We finally consider two possible levels of observance of a call:
• after, written as α: During the call the listener(s) incorporate the secrets of their
informer with their own secrets, and only after that, inspect the result.
• before, written as β: During the call the listener(s) inspect the secrets of their
informer before adding them to their own secrets.
The difference between the two levels of observance is quite subtle, but it can be
intuitively understood as follows. Think of the secrets known to an agent as a folder
containing a file for each known secret. If the observance level is β, the informer either
sends a copy of their secrets folder to the listener, or gives the listener read-only access
to the folder. The listener can then inspect the folder, thereby discovering exactly which
secrets are known to the informer, and makes copies of those secrets they didn’t already
know.
If the observance level is α, the informer is given write-only access to the listener’s
folder of secrets. The informer simply merges their folder with that of the listener,
without checking the result of the merger. If a secret A was unknown to the listener
before but known after this merger, the listener can conclude that the informer knows
A. If B remains unknown to the listener after the merger then the listener can conclude
that the informer doesn’t knowB, or at least didn’t know it at the time of the call. But if
C was already known to the listener before the merger, they gain no information about
whether the informer knows C.
Example 2.1.
a First, assume the call type is ( ,3, α). Consider the initial situation, i.e., where
everybody is only aware of their own secret, and assume that all agents know we are
in the initial situation. Assume moreover that first a call ab takes place, and then a
call bc. Let us now reason from the perspective of agent d. Because the privacy level
is , after the first call, agent d knows that both a and b are now familiar with A and
B. This then implies that d also knows that after the second call, a is familiar with
A and B, and both b and c are familiar with A,B, and C. In fact, everybody knows
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this. And since we (and, by assumption, the agents) are not interested in the value
of the secrets (a is familiar with B and hence knows its value, but d does not), we
conclude that all agents know the same! Similar reasoning can be done for the other
call types with privacy level .
b Second, assume the call type is ( ,3, o). Suppose that there are exactly three agents
a, b and c, and that the following calls just happened: ac, bc and ab (in that order).
After the first two calls, a knows A,C while b knows A,B,C. After the ab call,
both a and b therefore know A,B,C, i.e., they are experts.
Now, we can show the difference between o = β and o = α. If o = β, then in the
call ab agent a learns exactly which secrets b held before the call, i.e., the secrets
A,B and C. This allows a to deduce that there must have been a call between b and
c, where b learned A and C. In that call, c must also have learned the secret B. So
after the call ab, a knows that, in particular, FcB.
In contrast, if o = α, then in the call ab agent a only discovers that b holds a secret
X if a does not know X before the call. So a only learns that FbB (which is always
true), and not that FbA and FbC. As such, a cannot deduce that the call bc happened.
In particular, this means that a doesn’t know that FcB.
Since the goal of the agents is to turn everyone into experts, a may be tempted to
call c in order to guarantee FcB. We know that this call ac is unnecessary, because
c already knows B, but in this call type agent a does not.
c If there are exactly three agents and d = 3, there is no difference between and
. After all, if a call ab happens with privacy , then c notices that some call has
taken place, and that they themselves were not involved. The only possibilities for
this call are ab and ba, and with direction 3 those are equivalent. If the direction is .
or / , the calls ab and ba have different effects, so the difference between and is
relevant.
2.2 Language
Assume a finite set of agents Ag and a set of secrets S = {A | a ∈ Ag}. For each
direction type d ∈ {3, ., / } we define the language Ld as
Ld : ϕ ::= FaS | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [c]ϕ
where a ∈ Ag, S ∈ S and c ∈ Cd. For any call type τ = (p, d, o), with Lτ we mean
Ld. If the clause [c]ϕ is omitted, the corresponding language is denoted Lτ[ ]-free. So the
latter is the epistemic sublanguage of Lτ , without dynamic operators. We read FaS
as ‘agent a is familiar with the secret S’ (or ‘S belongs to the set of secrets a knows
about’) and Kaϕ as ‘agent a knows that formula ϕ is true’. K̂aϕ is shorthand for
¬Ka¬ϕ. Finally, [c]ϕ is read as “ϕ will be true after the call c.” So Lτ is a dynamic
epistemic language where atoms consist of ‘being familiar with’ statements about se-




D′∈S\Q ¬FaD′, i.e., agent
a is only (or, exactly) aware of the atoms in Q. Similarly, but somewhat more liber-
ally deviating from the meaning of ‘only knowing’, we let OabQ stand for “together,
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agents a and b only know the secrets in Q” and this is defined as
∧
B∈Q(FaB∨FbB)∧∧
B 6∈Q ¬(FaB ∨ FbB). We use root as an abbreviation for
∧
a∈Ag OaA.
The depth d(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is the number of nested knowledge operators, i.e,
d(FaB) = 0, d(¬ϕ) = d([c]ϕ) = d(ϕ), d(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = max(d(ϕ1), d(ϕ2)) and
d(Kaϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1. Note that the call operator [c] does not affect the depth of a
formula.
We will now define the notion of call sequence, which will feature both in our
semantics and in our object language. Given a call type τ , a call sequence~c of direction
type d is a finite sequence of calls, in symbols ~c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn), with ci ∈ Cd(1 ≤
i ≤ n). The empty sequence is denoted by ε. The set Cd collects all call sequences of
type d. We sometimes write Cτ for Cd, where τ = (p, d, o). If the direction type or
call type is clear from context or not important, we denote the set of call sequences by
C.
Given a call sequence ~c and a call c we denote by c.~c the prepending of ~c with
c, and by ~c.c the postpending of ~c with c. When ~c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn, . . .) the claim
a ∈ Ag(~c) is shorthand for a ∈ Ag(ci) for some i ≥ 1. Finally, by ~c.~d we denote
the concatenation of two finite sequences, ~c and ~d. Note that c1, c2 and c1.c2 basically
denote the same thing: a call sequence and the concatenation of two sequences. The
length `(~c) of ~c is defined in a straightforward way: `(ε) = 0 and `(c.~c) = `(~c.c) =
1 + `(~c).
For a call ~c and agent a, the a-reduction of ~c, denoted ~c|a consists of the calls in ~c
that a is involved in: ε|a = ε and (~c.c)|a = ~c|a if a 6∈ Ag(c) and ~c|a .c else.
We will write ~c = ~d for two call sequences if they are of the same length, and at
every index, they contain the same message (where we identify a3b with b3a). So for
instance, the sequence a . b, b . c is different from a . b, c . b, but a3b, b3c = a3b, c3b.
For any call sequence ~c ∈ C we define [~c]ϕ as an abbreviation:
[ε]ϕ = ϕ
[c.~c]ϕ = [c][~c]ϕ
We also use `(ϕ) to denote the maximum nesting depth of calls in ϕ, i.e., `(FaB) =
0, `(¬ϕ) = `(Kaϕ) = `(ϕ), `(ϕ∧ψ) = max(`(ϕ), `(ψ)) and `([~c]ϕ) = `(ϕ) + `(~c).
3 Semantics
3.1 Initial models and gossip models
Before modeling the entire gossip problem, we start by modeling the initial situation,
where the agents have not yet started gossiping. In most variants of the gossip problem
it is assumed that in this initial situation it is common knowledge that every agent
knows only their own secret. But this is not a necessary assumption: we can describe
gossip starting in any initial situation. For example, in the initial situation a could
be uncertain about whether b is already familiar with secret C before the gossiping
starts. Or the gossip could start from a situation where it is common knowledge that
a is spying on b, and that therefore a is initially aware of secrets A and B. The only
requirements we place on the initial situation is that every agent must be familiar with
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their own secret, and that agents must know which secrets they themselves are aware
of.
We denote the initial set of secrets familiar to a in world w as Q0(a,w), and the
initial epistemic accessibility relation as R0. The requirement that a knows their own
secret therefore means thatA ∈ Q0(a,w), and the requirement that agents know which
secrets they are aware of means that if (w1, w2) ∈ R0(a) thenQ0(a,w1) = Q0(a,w2).
The initial model is therefore defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. An initial model is a triple I = (W,R0, Q0) where W is a set of
worlds, R0 : Ag → 2W×W maps every agent to an equivalence relation and Q0 :
Ag × W → 2S satisfies (i) A ∈ Q0(a,w) for every (a,w) ∈ Ag × W and (ii) if
(w1, w2) ∈ R0(a) then Q0(a,w1) = Q0(a,w2).
When the agents start to gossip from an initial model I , using call type τ , the result
is represented by a gossip modelMτ (I) = (St,∼, Q). We define each of the tree parts
of Mτ (I) individually.
Definition 3.2. Let a call type τ and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0) be given. A
gossip state with respect to τ and I is a pair (w,~c) where w ∈W and ~c ∈ Cτ .
The set of gossip states with respect to τ and I is denoted StI,τ . When τ and I are
understood we write St for StI,τ .
At any point in time, the current situation can be uniquely identified by (i) where
we started and (ii) which calls happened since then. So the current situation is uniquely
identified by a gossip state. The set of secrets known by an agent in any gossip state
can be defined inductively.
Definition 3.3. Let a call type τ and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0) be given. The
set of secrets known to an agent in gossip state (w,~c), denoted QI,τ (a,w,~c), is given
inductively by
• QI,τ (a,w, ε) = Q0(a,w),
• QI,τ (a,w,~c.b . c) =
{
QI,τ (a,w,~c) ∪QI,τ (b, w,~c) if a = c
QI,τ (a,w,~c) otherwise
• QI,τ (a,w,~c.b / c) =
{
QI,τ (a,w,~c) ∪QI,τ (c, w,~c) if a = b
QI,τ (a,w,~c) otherwise
• QI,τ (a,w,~c.b3c) =
{
QI,τ (b, w,~c) ∪QI,τ (c, w,~c) if a ∈ {b, c}
QI,τ (a,w,~c) otherwise
When τ and I are understood we write Q for QI,τ . We also write Qa(w,~c) for
Q(a,w,~c).
Note that this definition captures the meaning of the direction type. Depending on
it the secrets are either shared between caller and callee (a3b), they are pushed from
the caller to the callee (a . b), or they are retrieved by the caller from the callee (a / b).
By now we have defined the set of gossip states, and “lifted” the initial secret dis-
tributionQ0 to a distributionQ for all gossip states. All that is left to do now is to “lift”
11
the indistinguishability relation R0 from the initial situation to all gossip states. Unlike
St and Q, the relation R depends on all three parameters, so this definition is slightly
more complex. We start with the case p = .
Definition 3.4. Let a call type τ = ( , d, o) and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0) be
given. For a ∈ Ag, the indistinguishability relation ∼I,τa ⊆ StI,τ × StI,τ is given by
• (w1, ε) ∼I,τa (w2, ε) iff (w1, w2) ∈ R0(a),
• (w1,~c1.c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2.c2) iff c1 = c2, (w1,~c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2) and one of the
following five conditions holds:
1. a 6∈ Ag(c1),
2. c1 = a . b,
3. c1 = b / a,
4. c1 ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = β and
QI,τb (w1,~c1) = Q
I,τ
b (w2,~c2) or
5. c1 ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = α and
QI,τa (w1,~c1.c1) = Q
I,τ
a (w2,~c2.c1).
When I and τ are understood we write ∼a for ∼I,τa .
Let us unpack this definition. The first clause is quite simple: in (w1, ε) and (w2, ε)
no calls have yet taken place, so these states are indistinguishable iff w1 and w2 are
indistinguishable in the initial model I . The second clause is more interesting. Firstly,
in order for (w1,~c1.c1) and (w2,~c2.c2) to be indistinguishable, it must be the case that
c1 = c2. This is because the privacy type is , which allows any agent to see exactly
which calls are taking place. Secondly, (w1,~c1) and (w2,~c2) must be indistinguish-
able. In other words, the new call c1 = c2 does not make a forget a distinction between
two states that they could make previously. Note that these two conditions imply that
if (w1,~c1) ∼a (w2,~c2) then ~c1 = ~c2.
Finally, one of the conditions 1–5 must hold. These conditions represent the fact
that the call c1 = c2 may give a insight into the set of secrets held by another agent. If
this insight differs between the two states, a can use that to distinguish between them.
For example, if c1 = c2 = a3b and in one state b teaches a the secretsB,C in this final
call while in the other state b only teaches a secret B, then a can distinguish between
(w1,~c1.c1) and (w2,~c2.c2).
If a 6∈ Ag(c1), then a is not involved in the call and therefore observes nothing
about the set of secrets held by any agent. Likewise, if the call is a.b or b / a, a observes
nothing about b’s secrets. If the call is one of {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, however, then a
may gain some insight into b’s secrets. Under the “before” observance type β, a can see
exactly which secrets b held before the call. So if QI,τ (b, w1,~c1) 6= QI,τ (b, w2,~c2),
then a can distinguish between the two states. Under the “after” observance type α, a
cannot see exactly which secrets b held before the call. But a does know which secrets
they were taught during the call. So if QI,τ (a,w1,~c1.c1) 6= QI,τ (a,w2,~c2.c1) then a
can distinguish between the states.
The p = case differs from in a small but important way.
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Definition 3.5. Let a call type τ = ( , d, o) and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0) be
given. For a ∈ Ag, the indistinguishability relation ∼I,τa ⊆ StI,τ × StI,τ is given by
• (w1, ε) ∼I,τa (w2, ε) iff (w1, w2) ∈ R0(a),
• (w1,~c1.c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2.c2) iff (w1,~c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2) and one of the following
five conditions holds:
1. a 6∈ Ag(c1) ∪Ag(c2),
2. c1 = c2 = a . b,
3. c1 = c2 = b / a,
4. c1 = c2 ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = β and
QI,τ (b, w1,~c1) = Q
I,τ (b, w2,~c2) or
5. c1 = c2 ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = α and
QI,τ (a,w1,~c1.c1) = Q
I,τ (a,w2,~c2.c1).
When I and τ are understood we write ∼a for ∼I,τa .
With privacy type , indistinguishability of (w1,~c1.c1) and (w2,~c2.c2) no longer
requires c1 = c2. After all, in this synchronous privacy type an agent a 6∈ Ag(c1) ∪
Ag(c2) does not know exactly which call took place, they only know that some call
happened and that they were involved in it. The privacy type only affects the informa-
tion that agents gain about calls they were not involved in, however, so conditions 2–4
remain unchanged between and except that we now need to specify that c1 = c2.
Indistinguishability for is slightly more complex. This is because with the asyn-
chronous privacy type an agent may be unable to distinguish between (w,~c) and
(v, ~d) even when ~c and ~d have different lengths.
Definition 3.6. Let a call type τ = ( , d, o) and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0)
be given. For a ∈ Ag, the indistinguishability relation ∼I,τa ⊆ StI,τ × StI,τ is the
smallest equivalence relation such that
• if (w1, w2) ∈ R0(a) then (w1, ε) ∼I,τa (w2, ε),
• if (w1,~c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2) and a 6∈ Ag(c) then (w1,~c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2.c),
• if (w1,~c1) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2) and one of the following four conditions holds
1. c = a . b,
2. c = b / a,
3. c ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = β and
QI,τ (b, w1,~c1) = Q
I,τ (b, w2,~c2) or
4. c ∈ {b . a, a / b, a3b, b3a}, o = α and
QI,τ (a,w1,~c1.c1) = Q
I,τ (a,w2,~c2.c1),
then (w1,~c1.c) ∼I,τa (w2,~c2.c).
When I and τ are understood we write ∼a for ∼I,τa .
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When a ∈ Ag(c), the privacy type is irrelevant so the conditions under which
c allows a to distinguish between the two states are the same in as in and .
If a 6∈ Ag(c), however, the privacy type is important. With p = , agent a is
completely unaware of such a call taking place, so (w1,~c1) ∼a (w2,~c2) implies
(w1,~c1) ∼a (w2,~c2.c). Because ∼a is defined to be the smallest equivalence relation
closed under these properties, we also immediately obtain that if a 6∈ Ag(~d1)∪Ag(~d2)
then (w1,~c1) ∼a (w2,~c2) implies (w1,~c1.~d1) ∼1 (w2,~c1.~d1).
Now that we have defined the set St of states, the indistinguishability relations
∼a and the sets Q of known secrets, defining a gossip model is simply a matter of
combining these three elements.
Definition 3.7. Let a call type τ and an initial model I = (W,R0, Q0) be given.
The gossip model with respect to τ and I , denoted Mτ (I), is given by Mτ (I) =
(StI,τ ,∼I,τa∈Ag, QI,τ ).
The class of all gossip models with respect to τ is denotedMτ .
3.2 The tree model
One can coherently describe the gossip problem starting in any initial situation. Typ-
ically, however, only one initial situation is considered, namely the one where it is
common knowledge that every agent knows only their own secret. In addition to mod-
eling the gossip problem in general, we would therefore also like to represent the gossip
problem starting in that specific initial situation. In general, every gossip model can be
seen as a forest, with the initial model forming its roots. In the special case where it is
common knowledge that every agent knows only their own secret we require only one
world in our initial model, so the resulting gossip model is a tree. We therefore refer to
it as the tree model.
Definition 3.8. Let Itree = (Wtree , Rtree , Otree) be the initial model given byWtree =
{wroot}, Rtree(a) = Wtree ×Wtree for every a and Otree(a,wroot) = {A} for every
a. The gossip model Mτtree := M
τ (Itree) is called the tree model for call type τ .
Note that the tree model is a specific tree; there are other gossip models that are
trees, but we do not refer to them as the tree model.
3.3 Semantics
Given a gossip model, the semantics for Lτ are pretty straightforward.
Definition 3.9. The satisfaction relation |= between gossip states and formulas is de-
fined inductively as follows.
M, (w,~c) |= FaB ⇔ B ∈ Qa(w,~c)
M, (w,~c) |= ¬ϕ ⇔ M, (w,~c) 6|= ϕ
M, (w,~c) |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, (w,~c) |= ϕ and M, (w,~c) |= ψ
M, (w,~c) |= Kaϕ ⇔ M, (w′,~c′) |= ϕ for all (w′,~c′) s. t. (w,~c) ∼a (w′,~c′)
M, (w,~c) |= [c]ϕ ⇔ M, (w,~c.c) |= ϕ
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If M, (w,~c) |= ϕ for every gossip state (w,~c) of M , we say that ϕ is valid on M and
write M |= ϕ. If M |= ϕ for all M ∈ Mτ we say that ϕ is valid and write |=τ ϕ. If
Mτtree |= ϕ we say that ϕ is valid in the tree model and write |=τtree ϕ.
We often omit reference to the modelM where that should not cause confusion, and
write w,~c |= ϕ for M, (w,~c) |= ϕ.
We can now discuss a the properties of various kinds of gossip. First, let us consider
a number of basic properties shared by all call types. Recall that OaQ, where Q ⊆ S,
means that a knows exactly the set Q of secrets.
Proposition 3.10. For every call type τ , every a ∈ Ag, everyB,D ∈ S, every~c ∈ Cτ ,







Persistence |=τ FaB → [c]FaB
Composition w,~c.(c1, c2, . . . , cn) |=τ ϕ iff w,~c |=τ [c1][c2] . . . , [cn]ϕ
F-Introspection |=τ (FaD ↔ KaFaD) ∧ (¬FaD ↔ Ka¬FaD)
Except for F-introspection, the above properties follow immediately from the se-
mantics. To see why F-introspection is valid, note that the initial model is defined
in such a way that if two worlds are a-indistinguishable, then a is aware of the same
secrets in both worlds. This property is preserved when calls happen, so an agent a
always knows which secrets they are aware of.
The property Unique states that there is always exactly one set of secrets that agent
a is aware of, and Own guarantees that this set includes A. Persistence tells us that
if an agents is familiar with a secret, this will remain true in the future. According to
Composition, the definition of composition behaves as desired, and F-Introspection
tells us that agents know which secrets they are familiar with.
The 10 properties described in the following proposition do depend on the privacy
type. Some of them also depend on whether we consider only the tree model, or all
gossip models.
Proposition 3.11. Consider the following schemes, where a, b and c are different
agents. (Recall that K̂a = ¬Ka¬ and root =
∧
a∈Ag OaA.)
fi Full Ignorance K̂aFbC
pp Postponed Ignorance [c]K̂aFbC where a 6∈ Ag(c)
vi Visibility [c]Ka(FbC ∨ FcB) where Ag(c) = (b, c)
co Commute [c][d]ϕ↔ [d][c]ϕ, where Ag(c) ∩Ag(d) = ∅
fk Full Knowledge ϕ↔ Kaϕ
if Initial Full Knowledge root → (ϕ↔ Kaϕ)
fp Full Privacy Kaϕ↔ [c]Kaϕ where a 6∈ Ag(c)
pr Perfect Recall Ka[c]ϕ→ [c]Kaϕ where a 6∈ Ag(c)
or Own Perfect Recall Ka[c]ϕ→ [c]Kaϕ where a ∈ Ag(c)
ns No Surprises [c]Kaϕ→ Ka[c]ϕ
Then the following table shows the effect of the different privacy levels on those schemes
as a validity:
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τ(p) fi pp vi co fk if fp pr or ns
× × X X × × × X X ×
× X × × × × × × X ×
X X × X × × X × × ×
(tree) × × X X X X × X X X
(tree) × X × × × X × × X ×
(tree) X X × X × × X × × ×
The properties fi, pp and vi very directly describe what agents know about calls that
they are not involved in. If τ(p) = , agent a can never be certain that c hasn’t told b
their secret, so fi holds. If τ(p) = then a may initially be certain that c hasn’t told b
their secret, but any call where a is not involved might have been between b and c, and
therefore makes a uncertain about FbC. As a result, pp holds. Finally, if τ(p) = ,
then a knows exactly which calls happen, so after a call between b and c agent a will,
depending on the call direction, know either FbC or FcB. So vi holds.
The property co is interesting because it holds for and , but for different reasons.
If τ(p) = , the calls c and d commute because no agent can distinguish between the
two orders. If τ(p) = , then c and d commute because it is common knowledge that
exactly those two calls happened and that their order does not matter.3 If τ(p) = , the
two calls do not commute because the agents cannot be certain thatAg(c)∩Ag(d) = ∅.
For example, (wroot , ε) |= [c3d][a3b]Ka¬FcA but (wroot , ε) 6|= [a3b][c3d]Ka¬FcA,
because as far as a can tell the second call could have been b3c instead of c3d.
Now, consider the properties fk and if. Any gossip state in the tree model is of the
form (wroot ,~c) for some ~c. So if an agent a can identify the exact call sequence ~c, that
agent knows exactly which state they are in, so we have ϕ↔ Kaϕ. With , all agents
always know the call sequence, so |=( ,d,o)tree fk . With , agents know the call sequence
if it happens to be ε, so (wroot , ε) |=( ,d,o) ϕ↔ Kaϕ. Since (wroot , ε) is uniquely (in
the tree model) identified by the formula root , it follows that |=( ,d,o)tree if . With the
agents never know the exact call sequence, so neither fk nor if are valid for that privacy
type.
The validity of fp for , like that of fi, follows immediately from thew fact that a
cannot tell whether c has happened unless a ∈ Ag(c). The property pr holds for
because in that privacy type agent a knows which call has taken place. This allows a
to turn their pre-call hypothetical reasoning Ka[c]ϕ into post-call unconditional rea-
soning [c]Kaϕ. With privacy this doesn’t work, because while a can do hypothetical
reasoning about what would happen if c were to place, after the call they will not be
certain that c was indeed the call that took place. If a themselves is involved in c then
they can be certain that c took place, so or does hold for . For even or fails, since
after c happened a cannot be certain that only a took place; a cannot distinguish be-
tween c and c.d. Finally, ns holds only if a knows in advance what the result of a call
c will be. This is only valid in the tree model with privacy .
Note that for each privacy type we can find a validity that holds for that type but
3This can be shown quite easily by induction on the depth of ϕ.
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not for either of the other types. We have |=τ vi if and only if τ(p) = , |=τ pp ∧ or
if and only if τ(p) = and |=τ fi if and only if τ(p) = .
The other parameters can also be uniquely identified by a validity.
Proposition 3.12. For any three different agents a, b and c and their associated secrets
A,B and C the following equivalences hold.
|=τ (¬FaB ∧ ¬FbA)→ [ab](¬FaB ∧ FbA) iff τ(d) = .
|=τ (¬FaB ∧ ¬FbA)→ [ab](FaB ∧ ¬FbA) iff τ(d) = /
|=τ (¬FaB ∧ ¬FbA)→ [ab](FaB ∧ FbA) iff τ(d) = 3
|=τ (FbC ∧ FaC)→ ([ab]KaFbC ∨ [ab]KbFaC) iff τ(o) = β
|=τ (Ka((ObABC ∧OcABC) ∨ (ObB ∧OcAC)) ∧ ¬KaFbC ∧ FaC)
→ ([ab]¬KaFcB ∧ [ba]¬KaFcB) iff τ(o) = α
The validities for ., / and 3 are simple, so we don’t discuss them further. With
regard to the validity for β, recall that observance level β means that if a is the listener
in a call ab then a inspects b’s secrets before merging them with their own set of secrets.
In particular, this means that a will become aware of exactly which secrets b knew at
the time of the call. Regardless of the call direction a will be the listener in at least one
of the calls ab and ba, so it follows that the fourth formula is valid if τ(o) = β.
The validity characterizing α is slightly more complicated. Let us first look at the
situation described by the fifth formula’s antecedent. It states that a knows secret C
and is uncertain between exactly two possibilities for the sets of secrets known by b and
c: either b knows only B and c knows AC, or b and c both know ABC. This situation
typically occurs with call type ( ,3, α) where exactly one call ac has taken place, but
it can happen for any call type given the appropriate initial model. In this situation, if
a were to learn that b already knows secret C, they would also learn that c knows B.
However, if the observance level is α, then in any call the listener will not observe the
informer’s secrets directly; instead the listener only observes their new set of secrets
after the informer’s secrets have been added. In particular, if the listener already knows
a particular secret then they will not find out whether the informer also knew that secret.
As a result, under observance α neither the call ab nor the call ba will inform a about
whether b knew A or C before the call. Agent a’s uncertainty about whether c knows
B is therefore not removed by these calls, so the fifth formula of Proposition 3.12 is
valid if τ(o) = α.
3.4 n-Bisimilarity
Every gossip model is, in particular, a model of modal logic. We can therefore apply
some of the methods of modal logic. In particular, we will make use of n-bisimilarity.
Definition 3.13 (n-bisimulation). Let n ∈ N, and let M = (St,∼, Q) and M ′ =
(St′,∼′, Q′) be two gossip models. The states s ∈ St and s′ ∈ St′ are n-bisimilar,
denoted M, s!n M ′, s′ if
Atoms for every a ∈ Ag, Qa(s) = Q′a(s′),
Forth if n > 0, then for every t ∈ St and a ∈ Ag, if s ∼a t then for some t′ ∈ St′,
also s′ ∼a t′ and M, t!n−1 M ′, t′,
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Back if n > 0, then for every t′ ∈ St′ and a ∈ Ag, if s′ ∼a t′ then for some t ∈ St,
also s ∼a t and M, t!n−1 M ′, t′.
When the model is clear from context we write s !n s′ for M, s !n M ′, s′.
The following theorem is well known in modal logic, see for example [11]:
Theorem 3.14. Let M, s and M ′, s′ be pointed models. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
1. M, s and M ′, s′ are n-bisimilar,
2. for every ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free of depth at most n, M, s |= ϕ iff M
′, s′ |= ϕ.
It is easy to see that the relation !n is an equivalence relation. Furthermore, since
our set of atoms is finite, for given n the number of different equivalence classes with
respect to !n is finite.
The following theorem will be important at several places in the paper, and states
that n-bisimilarity is preserved under call sequences.
Theorem 3.15 (Preservation of !n). If (w1,~c1) !n (w2,~c2) then for every call
sequence ~d, (w1,~c1.~d) !n (w2,~c2.~d).
Proof. We give the proof for τ(p) = , the proofs for τ(p) = and τ(p) = are
similar but simpler.
It suffices to show that the theorem holds whenever ~d is a single call ab, the theorem
then follows by repeatedly adding single calls. We use a proof by induction on n.
First, note that the sets of secrets known to the agents after a call are fully deter-
mined by the sets of secrets known to the agents before the call. Since (w1,~c1) !n
(w2,~c2) it follows that, in particular, the two states agree on all atoms. It follows that
(w1,~c1.~d) and (w2,~c2.~d) also agree on all atoms. So Atoms holds for (w1,~c1.~d) and
(w2,~c2.~d).
As base case, suppose that n = 0. In that case, Forth and Back are trivial. We
already showed that Atoms holds, so (w1,~c1.ab) !0 (w2,~c2.ab). Suppose then as
induction hypothesis that n > 0 and that the theorem holds for all n′ < n. We have
already shown that Atoms holds, left to show is that Forth and Back hold.
Take any agent c, and any state (w′1,~c
′
1) ∼c (w1,~c1.ab). First, suppose that
c 6∈ {a, b}. Then any call sequence is c-indistinguishable from ~c1.ab if and only
if it is c-indistinguishable from ~c1. So we have (w′1,~c
′
1) ∼c (w1,~c1). By the n-
















2). We have shown that Forth holds for
c 6∈ {a, b}.
Suppose then that c ∈ {a, b}. The c-reductions of ~c1, ab and ~c′1 must be the same,





1, where c doesn’t occur in ~d
′
1 and (w1,~c1) ∼c
(w′1,
~d1). By the assumption that (w1,~c1) !n (w2,~c2) there is (w′2, ~d2) ∼c (w2,~c2)
such that (w′2, ~d2) !n−1 (w
′
1,
~d1). Now, consider the state (w′2, ~d2.ab.~d
′
1). By the









Furthermore, consider (w2,~c2.ab) and (w′2, ~d2.ab.~d
′
1). Since c doesn’t occur in ~d
′
1
and (w2,~c2) ∼c (w′2, ~d2), c cannot distinguish between (w2,~c2.ab) and (w′2, ~d2.ab.~d′1)
unless the information gained in the ab call differs between the two sequences. But the
information gained by c from the ab call is the same in (w2,~c2.ab) and (w1,~c1.ab),
since (w2,~c2) !n (w2,~c1), so they agree on all atoms. Similarly, the informa-
tion c learns from the ab call is the same in (w1,~c1.ab) and (w′1, ~d1.ab.~d
′
1), because








~d2) !n−1 (w′1, ~d1). Taken together, these three
facts imply that c learns the same in the ab calls of (w2,~c2.ab) and (w′2, ~d2.ab.~d
′
1), so
(w2,~c2.ab) ∼c (w′2, ~d2.ab.~d′1).











1), so we have shown that Forth holds for c ∈ {a, b}. We had already
shown that Forth holds for c 6∈ {a, b}.
Due to symmetry it can be shown in the same way that Back holds. So this con-
cludes the induction step and thereby the proof.
It follows truth is preserved under n-bisimilarity for every formula of depth n, not
just for epistemic formulas.
Corollary 3.16. For every ϕ ∈ Lτ , if d(ϕ) = n and (w1,~c1) !n (w2,~c2) then
(w1,~c1) |= ϕ if and only if (w2,~c2) |= ϕ.
Furthermore, we can use preservation of n-bisimilarity to prove a bound on the
length of call sequences that we need to consider.
Proposition 3.17. Let a call type τ and a formula ϕ be given, and let n = d(ϕ). For
any gossip model M and any state (w, ~d.~c) of that model, if (w, ~d.~c) |= ϕ then there
is a call sequence ~c′ such that `(~c′) ≤ f(n) and (w, ~d.~c′) |= ϕ, where f(n) is the
number of n-bisimilarity classes.
Proof. If `(~c) ≤ f(n), the proposition is trivial. So suppose that `(~c) > f(n). Then
there must be two different initial fragments ~c1 and ~c2 of ~c such that (w, ~d.~c1) !n
(w, ~d.~c2). Now, let~c3 be the remainder of~c after~c2, i.e.,~c = ~c2.~c3. By Theorem 3.15,
(w, ~d.~c1.~c3) !n (w, ~d.~c2.~c3). Since ~c2.~c3 = ~c and truth of ϕ is preserved under n-
bisimulation, it follows that (w, ~d.~c1.~c3) |= ϕ. We have `(~c1.~c3) < `(~c), so ~c is not
the shortest call sequences after which ϕ is true. We can use this procedure to find
progressively shorter call sequences after which ϕ is true, until we find one that is of
length at most f(n).
3.5 Decidability of model checking and validity checking
For any logic, there are two main computational problems that we would like to solve,
namely the model checking problem and the validity checking problem. Validity check-
ing can be defined as usual, except that we can define two different versions: one for
|= and one for |=tree .
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Definition 3.18. The validity checking problem for a call type τ is to determine, for
any input formula ϕ ∈ Lτ , whether |=τ ϕ. The tree-validity checking problem for a
call type τ is to determine, for any input formula ϕ ∈ Lτ , whether |=τtree ϕ.
When defining the model checking problem, we have to be a bit more careful. The
input for a computational problem is generally assumed to be finite, but every gossip
model is infinite. It therefore makes more sense to define the model checking problem
in terms of an initial model, as opposed to a gossip model.
Definition 3.19. The model checking problem for a call type τ is to determine, for any
input formula ϕ ∈ Lτ , any finite initial model I = (W,R,Q), any w ∈ W and any
call sequence ~c, whether M(I), (w,~c) |= ϕ.
In [4], it was shown that model checking for the tree model with call type τ =
( , d, α) is decidable, when restricted to formulas of depth at most 1. Here, we will
show that model checking, validity checking and tree-validity checking are all decid-
able for every call type and for unrestricted formula depth.
Theorem 3.20. For any call type τ , the model checking problem, validity problem and
tree-validity problem for τ are decidable.
Proof. We start with the model checking problem. It is not possible to fully construct
the model M(I), since that model is infinite. What we can do, however, is construct
M(I) lazily, i.e., we only construct a state (w,~c) once we have to do so in order to
evaluate a formula.
In the synchronous case, so if τ(p) ∈ { , }, indistinguishability is only possible
for call sequences of the same length. So (w,~c) ∼a (w′,~c′) implies `(~c) = `(~c′).
When evaluating [~d]ϕ in (w,~c), we need to create the state (w,~c.~d) and evaluate
ϕ there. When evaluating Kaϕ in (w,~c) we need to create every state (w′,~c′) such
that (w,~c) ∼a (w′,~c′), and evaluate ϕ there. Overall, in order to determine whether
M(I), (w,~c) |= ϕ we only need to create states (w′,~c′) where `(~c′) ≤ `(~c) + `(ϕ). It
follows that model checking for and is decidable.
In the asynchronous case, things are more complicated. When evaluating [~d]ϕ in
(w,~c), we still only need to create the state (w,~c.~d) and evaluate ϕ there. When
evaluating Kaϕ, however, we would need to create every state (w′,~c′) ∼a (w,~c), and
there are infinitely many such states.
Fortunately, when (w,~c) ∼a (w′, ~d), (w,~c) ∼a (w′, ~d′) and (w′, ~d) !n−1
(w′, ~d′), invariance of ϕ under n-bisimulation implies that we only need to check ϕ in
only one of the states.
Take any (w′, ~d) such that (w,~c) ∼a (w′,~c′). Then ~c and ~c′ have the same a-
reductions, so ~c = ~c0.c1.~c1. · · · .cm.~cm and ~d = ~d0.c1.~d1. · · · .cm.~dm, where a does
not occur in any ~ci or ~di.
Using Theorem 3.15, we can replace every ~di by ~d′i such that (i) `(~di) ≤ f(n− 1)
and (ii) for every i, (w′, ~d0.c0. · · · .~di) !n (w′, ~d′0.c1. · · · .~d′i). Let ~d′ = ~d′0.c0. · · · .~dm.
Then at every call ci, the set of secrets observed by a is the same in ~d and ~d′. It fol-
lows that (w′, ~d) ∼a (w′, ~d′). By assumption, (w′, ~d) ∼a (w,~c), so because ∼a is an
equivalence relation it follows that (w′, ~d′) ∼a (w,~c).
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The length of ~d′ is bounded by m+ f(n− 1) · (m+ 1). So in order to determine
whether M(I), (w,~c) |= Kaϕ we only have to check whether M(I), (w′, ~d′) |= ϕ for
all (w′, ~d′) ∼a (w,~c) where the length of ~d′ is bounded. The model checking problem
for is therefore decidable.
The fact that the model checking problem is decidable for every call type can now
be used to show that the validity and tree validity checking problems are decidable.
Tree-validity can be reduced to checking whether M(Itree), (wroot ,~c) |= ϕ for all ~c of
length at most f(n). Validity can be reduced to checking whether M(I), (w,~c) |= ϕ
for some maximal set of non-n-bisimilar initial models I , all worlds of those models
and all ~c of length at most f(n).
4 Axiomatisation: Synchronous Case
We have just shown that the validity problem is decidable, so the existence of a recur-
sive axiomatization is trivial; we could simply use one axiom
All ` ϕ where |= ϕ.
That axiomatization is neither very elegant nor very insightful, however, so we present
some more concrete axiomatizations as well.
For every call type τ , we will present two axiomatizations: one that is sound and
complete for τ on all gossip models, and one that is sound and complete for τ on the
tree model. We start by presenting a proof system that is sound and complete for call-
free formulas on all gossip models. Later on, we will add axioms for calls, and rules
that renders the proof system complete for the tree model.
Propositional Knowledge
Prop propositional tautologies K Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ)
MP ` ϕ,` ϕ→ ψ imply ` ψ T Kaϕ→ ϕ
Sub ` ϕ↔ ψ implies ` χ↔ χ[ϕ/ψ] 4 Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ
5 ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ
Nec(K) ` ϕ implies ` Kaϕ
Secrets (static)
Own FaA
PFi FaB → KaFaB
NPi ¬FaB → Ka¬FaB
Table 1: The rules and axioms of G. In the rule Sub of so-called “substitution of
equivalents” the expression χ[ϕ/ψ] stands for substitution of some or all occurrences
of subformula ϕ of χ by ψ.
The basic proof system G is shown in Table 1. The reader may note that G does
not depend on the call type in any way, hence the omission of the index τ . This inde-
pendence of the call type is to be expected, considering that G is a proof system for the
call-free fragment of the language.
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Another observation the reader might make is that the proof system G is very
similar to the standard proof system S5 for modal logic. The only difference between
S5 and G is that the latter system includes the three extra axioms Own, PFi and NPi
for secrets. As a result, the soundness and completeness proofs for G are very similar
to that for S5. The first three lemmas are completely standard, so we omit their proofs.
Lemma 4.1 (Soundness). The proof system G is sound with respect to the class of
gossip models.
Definition 4.2. A set Γ ⊆ Lτ[ ]-free of formulas is consistent if Γ 6` ⊥, maximal if for
every ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ and maximal consistent if it is both maximal
and consistent.
Definition 4.3. Let Γ ⊆ Lτ[ ]-free be a set of formulas. Then K
−1
a Γ := {ϕ | Kaϕ ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 4.4. If Γ is a maximal consistent set, then K−1a Γ is consistent.
Lemma 4.5. If Γ is consistent, then there is a maximal consistent set ∆ ⊇ Γ.
The construction of the canonical model is mostly as usual, but there is one com-
plication: gossip models are required to be forests, where each node has exactly one
[c]-successor for every possible call c. Fortunately, this issue is reasonably easy to
solve. A gossip model M(I) is fully determined by its initial model I , so we can use
the maximal consistent sets as the initial model, and build our canonical model on top
of it. For the privacy types and this is reasonably straightforward, for we need to
do more work.
Definition 4.6. Let τ = (p, d, o) with p ∈ { , }. The canonical initial model Iτ =
(W τ , Rτ , Qτ ) is given by
• W τ is the set of maximal consistent sets,
• Rτa := {(Γ,∆) ∈W τ ×W τ | K−1Γ ⊆ ∆},
• Qτ (a,Γ) := {B | FaB ∈ Γ}.
The canonical model Mτ is given by Mτ := M(Iτ ).
Now that we have built Mτ on top of Iτ , we can immediately forget about most
of its states: every epistemic formula that is satisfied in some state of Mτ is already
satisfied in one of its root states.
Lemma 4.7 (Truth Lemma). For every maximal consistent set Γ and every ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free,
we have Mτ , (Γ, ε) |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Because τ(p) ∈ { , }, a state (Γ, ε) can only be a-indistinguishable from
another state if that state is of the form (∆, ε). As a result, Mτ , (Γ, ε) |= ϕ if and only
if Iτ ,Γ |= ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free.
Using the same arguments as the standard truth lemma for modal logic, we can
see that Iτ ,Γ |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ. Combining both equivalences, we get
Mτ , (Γ, ε) |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ.
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Theorem 4.8. The proof system G is sound and strongly complete for Lτ[ ]-free on the
class of all gossip models for call types ( , d, o) and ( , d, o).
Now that we have a proof system for the call-free formulas, we can add extra ax-
ioms and rules for formulas with calls. These axioms can be separated into four groups.
The call basics state some basic facts about calls. The effect axioms describe the se-
crets that agents learn through a call that they are involved in. The observance axioms
describe the other facts that agents learn through calls that they are involved in. Finally,
the privacy axioms describe what agents learn from calls that they were not involved
in. These axioms are shown in Tables 2–5.
Call Basics
K(c) [c](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([c]ϕ→ [c]ψ)
Fnc [c]¬ϕ↔ ¬[c]ϕ
Nec(c) `τ ϕ implies `τ [c]ϕ
Table 2: Basic axioms and rule for calls
Effect Axioms
Effect for outsiders
Ext [c]FaB ↔ FaB a 6∈ Ag(c)
Effect per direction type
Eff1(.) [a . b]FaD ↔ FaD
Eff2(.) [a . b]FbD ↔ (FaD ∨ FbD)
Eff1(/) [a / b]FbD ↔ FbD
Eff2(/) [a / b]FaD ↔ (FaD ∨ FbD)
Eff(3) [a3 b]FcD ↔ (FaD ∨ FbD) c ∈ {a, b}
Table 3: Axioms for the effect of a call.
If τ = ( , d, o) or τ = ( , d, o), the proof system Gτ is obtained by adding the
relevant axioms from Tables 2–5 to the basic proof system G. We should first convince
ourselves of the soundness of this proof system.
Proposition 4.9. The proof system Gτ is sound forLτ on the class of all gossip models
for call types τ = ( , d, o) and τ = ( , d, o).
Proof. The axiom K(c) and rule Nec(c) are sound because [c] is a relation on gossip
models. The axiom Fnc is sound because the relation [c] is a function. The effect
axioms are a straightforward encoding of the secrets that are exchanged in the relevant
call type, so we consider their soundness to be obvious.
The observance axioms represent a kind of hypothetical reasoning. We look at the
axiom Obsr(., α) in detail. With observation level α, the information that the recipient
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Axioms for observance level β for sender (Obss) and receiver (Obsr)
Obss(., β) [a . b]Kaϕ↔ Ka[a . b]ϕ
Obsr(., β) [a . b]Kbϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(OaQ ∧Kb(OaQ→ [a . b]ϕ))
Obss(/ , β) [a / b]Kbϕ↔ Kb[a / b]ϕ
Obsr(/ , β) [a / b]Kaϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(ObQ ∧Ka(ObQ→ [a / b]ϕ))
Obss,r(3, β) [a3b]Kcϕ↔
∨
Q,R⊆S(OaQ ∧ObR ∧Kc((OaQ ∧ObR)→ [a3b]ϕ)) c ∈ {a, b}
Axioms for observance level α for sender (Obss) and receiver (Obsr)
Obss(., α) [a . b]Kaϕ↔ Ka[a . b]ϕ
Obsr(., α) [a . b]Kbϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(OabQ ∧Kb(OabQ→ [a . b]ϕ))
Obss(/ , α) [a / b]Kbϕ↔ Kb[a / b]ϕ
Obsr(/ , α) [a / b]Kaϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(OabQ ∧Ka(OabQ→ [a / b]ϕ))
Obss,r(3, α) [a3 b]Kcϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(OabQ ∧Kc(OabQ→ [a3 b]ϕ)) c ∈ {a, b}
Table 4: Axioms about observance.
Privacy Axioms
Pri( ) [c]Kaϕ↔ Ka[c]ϕ a 6∈ Ag(c)
Pri( ) [c]Kaϕ↔ Ka
∧
{c′∈Cd|a 6∈Ag(c′)} [c
′]ϕ a 6∈ Ag(c)
Table 5: Axioms for the the effect of privacy.
b of a call a . b learns is the set of secrets known to either agent before the call, i.e.,
the set Q such that OabQ. As such, we have [a . b]Kbϕ if and only if before this call, b
could already predict that if the shared set of secrets was Q, then ϕ would be true after
the call. Conditioning on the set of shared secrets can be done using a disjunction over
all possibilities, so we have [a . b]Kbϕ↔
∨
Q⊆S(OabQ ∧Kb(OabQ→ [a . b]ϕ)). So
the axiom is sound.
More formally, recall that with this call type we have (w,~c.a . b) ∼b (w′,~c′.c)
if and only if c = a . b, (w,~c) ∼b (w′,~c′) and the set of secrets known to either a
or b is the same in (w,~c) and (w′,~c′). As a result, we have the following chain of
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equivalences.
M, (w,~c) |= [a . b]Kbϕ
⇔M, (w,~c.a . b) |= Kbϕ
⇔ ∀(w′,~c′.c) ∼b (w,~c.a . b) : M, (w′,~c′.c) |= ϕ
⇔ ∀(w′,~c′) ∼b (w,~c) : if Qab(w,~c) = Qab(w′,~c′) then M, (w′,~c′.a . b) |= ϕ
⇔ ∀(w′,~c′) ∼b (w,~c) : M, (w′,~c′) |= OabQ(w,~c)→ [a . b]ϕ




(OabQ ∧Kb(OabQ→ [a . b]ϕ))
So Obsr(., α) is sound. Soundness of the other observance axioms can be shown
similarly.
Finally, consider the privacy axioms. Like the observance axioms, these represent
hypothetical reasoning. With privacy type , if a call c with a 6∈ Ag(c) takes place,
then a learns that this call took place, but no more. This means that a will know ϕ after
the call if and only if before the call a knew that if the call were to take place, then ϕ
would become true. So with privacy we have [c]Kaϕ↔ Ka[c]ϕ.
With privacy type , agent a does not learn that the call c took place. Instead, a
only learns that some call took place that they were not involved in. This means that
a will know ϕ after the call if and only if before the call a knew that any call not





One important property of these axioms is that they are reduction axioms for the
operator [c]. That is to say, these axioms are equivalences4 with the property that the
formulas inside the scope of a [c] operator on the right hand side (if any) are strict
subformulas of those on the left hand side. This yields the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. Let τ = ( , d, o) or τ = ( , d, o). Then for every formula ϕ ∈ Lτ
there is a formula ψ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free such that `
τ ϕ↔ ψ.
Proof. We give a detailed proof for the case τ = ( , ., α). First, note that because
{¬,→} is truth-functionally complete, we can assume without loss of generality that
ϕ contains only these Boolean connectives. Secondly, because Sub allows us to sub-
stitute provably equivalent formulas, it suffices to show the theorem for formulas of the
form ϕ = [a . b]χ, where χ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free.
We now prove the theorem by induction on the construction of χ. As base case,
suppose that χ is an atom, so ϕ = [a . b]FcD. If c 6= b, then by Ext or Eff1(.) we
have `τ [a . b]FcD ↔ FcD. If c = b, then by Eff2(.) we have `τ [a . b]FcD ↔
(FaD ∨ FcD). In either case, ϕ is provably equivalent to a formula ψ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free.
Suppose then as induction hypothesis that χ is not atomic, and that for every strict
subformula χ′ of χ and for every c, d the formula [c . d]χ′ is provably equivalent to
some ψ′ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free. We continue with a case distinction on the main connective of χ.
4Except for K(c), but [c](ϕ→ ψ) ↔ ([c]ϕ→ [c]ψ) is provable using K(c) and Fnc.
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• Suppose ϕ = [a . b]¬χ′. Axiom Fnc yields `τ [a . b]¬χ′ ↔ ¬[a . b]χ′. By the
induction hypothesis `τ [a . b]χ′ ↔ ψ′ so, using Sub, we have `τ [a . b]¬χ′ ↔
¬ψ′.
• Suppose ϕ = [a . b](χ′ → χ′′). Using K(c) and Fnc, we have `τ [a . b](χ′ →
χ′′)↔ ([a.b]χ′ → [a.b]χ′′). By the induction hypothesis, `τ [a.b]χ′ ↔ ψ′ and
`τ [a . b]χ′′ ↔ ψ′′. Using Sub, this yields `τ [a . b](χ′ → χ′′)↔ (ψ′ → ψ′′).
• Suppose ϕ = [a . b]Kcχ′, where c 6= b. Then using either Pri( ) or Obss(., α)
we have `τ [a . b]Kcχ′ ↔ Kc[a . b]χ′. By the induction hypothesis, `τ [a .
b]χ′ ↔ ψ′ and therefore, using Sub, `τ [a . b]Kcχ′ ↔ Kcψ′.
• Suppose ϕ = [a . b]Kbχ′. Then Obsr(., α) states that `τ [a . b]Kbχ′ ↔∨
Q⊆S(OabQ ∧ Kb(OabQ → [a . b]χ′)). By the induction hypothesis, `τ




These are all possible main connectives of χ, so this completes the induction. The
proofs for the other call types are very similar, using the appropriate axioms. So we
omit those cases here.
Completeness of Gτ for Lτ now follows immediately.
Corollary 4.11. The proof system Gτ is strongly complete for Lτ on the class of all
gossip models for call types τ = ( , d, o) and τ = ( , d, o).
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ Lτ and ϕ ∈ Lτ be such that Γ |=τ ϕ. Let ϕ′ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free and Γ
′ ⊆
Lτ[ ]-free be such that `
τ ϕ ↔ ϕ′ and Γ′ = {γ′ | ∃γ ∈ Γ :`τ γ ↔ γ′}. Then Γ′ |= ϕ′
and therefore, by completeness of G for Lτ[ ]-free (Theorem 4.8), Γ
′ ` ϕ′. Since G is a
fragment of Gτ , this implies Γ′ `τ ϕ′. Furthermore, using the provable equivalence of
ϕ′ and ϕ as well as γ′ and γ, we get Γ `τ ϕ.
We have now shown soundness and completeness.
Theorem 4.12. The proof system Gτ is sound and strongly complete for Lτ on the
class of all gossip models for call types τ = ( , d, o) and τ = ( , d, o).
5 Axiomatisation: Asynchronous Case
In Section 4, we introduced axiomatizations for synchronous call types, with privacy
types or . Here, we consider the asynchronous privacy type . We therefore assume
throughout the section that the privacy type is . The first thing to note is that the obser-
vance axioms of Table 4 are not sound in the asynchronous case. Take for example the
formula [a. b]Ka¬FcA↔ Ka[a. b]¬FcA, which is an instance of axiom Obss(., α).
But now consider the rooted model M, ε. We have M, ε |= Ka[a . b]¬FcA, because a
knows that the single call a. b will not, by itself, teach c the secret A. But after the call
a.b has happened, agent a cannot be certain that this is the only call that happened; we
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have a.b ∼a a.b.b.c. BecauseM,a.b.b.c 6|= ¬FcA, we haveM,a.b 6|= Ka¬FcA
and therefore M, ε 6|= [a . b]Ka¬FcA. So the axiom Obss(., α) is not satisfied.
The problem lies in the fact that in the asynchronous case agent a always considers
it possible that any number of calls (not involving a) happened after the call a . b. So
while
[a . b]Kaϕ↔ Ka[a . b]ϕ
is unsound,




is sound. Sound variants of the other observance axioms can be obtained similarly.
Unfortunately, {~c | a 6∈ Ag(~c)} is an infinite set, so this sound version of the axiom
is not technically a formula. However, it turns out that we do not need to consider all
sequences not containing a, a finite subset of them will suffice.
We first use an n-bisimilarity argument to give a bound that works for every call
direction (., / ,3) and both observance types (β, α). This bound is rather large, how-
ever, so we also give an improved bound that applies to most, but not all, combinations
of direction and observance.
5.1 A general bound using n-bisimilarity
For any direction and observance type, we can now leverage preservation of n-bisimilarity
(see Theorem 3.15) to limit the number of call sequences that we need to consider. For
example, we have the following.
Proposition 5.1. Let τ = ( , ., α). Furthermore, let ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free be a formula of depth
n. Then




where C = {~c | a 6∈ Ag(~c) and `(~c) ≤ f(n)} and f(n) is the number of equivalence
classes with respect to !n.
Proof. We start from left to right, so suppose that M, (w, ~d) |= [a . b]Kaϕ. To show
is that M, (w, ~d) |= Ka
∧
~c∈C [a . b.~c]ϕ. So take any (w
′,~e) ∼a (w, ~d). Then for any
~c such that a 6∈ Ag(~c) we also have (w′,~e.a . b.~c) ∼a (w, ~d.a . b), since neither the
a . b call nor any of the calls not involving a allow the agent to distinguish between the
two sequences. Since M, (w, ~d) |= [a . b]Kaϕ, it follows that M, (w′, ~d.a . b.~c) |= ϕ.
Since this holds for every ~c with a 6∈ Ag(~c), we have M, (w,~e) |=
∧
~c∈C [a . b.~c]ϕ,
which was to be shown.
Left to show is right to left, so suppose that M, (w, ~d) |= Ka
∧
~c∈C [a . b.~c]ϕ. To
show is that M, (w, ~d) |= [a . b]Kaϕ. So take any (w′,~e) ∼a (w, ~d.a . b). Then ~e
must be of the form (~e1.a . b.~e2) such that (w, ~d) ∼a (w′,~e1) and a 6∈ Ag(~e2). We
make a case distinction on `(~e2).
If `(~e2) ≤ f(n), then ~e2 ∈ C. It therefore follows from M, (w, ~d) |= Ka
∧
~c∈C [a .
b.~c]ϕ that M, (w′,~e1.a . b.~e2) |= ϕ.
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If `(~e2) > f(n), then by the pigeonhole principle there must be at least two calls
c1 and c2 such that ~e2 = ~f1.c1.~f2.c2.~f3 and ~e1.a . b.~f1.c1 !n ~e1.a . b.~f1.c1.~f2.c2. By
Theorem 3.15 this implies that ~e1.a . b.~f1.c1.~f3 !n ~e. As long as `(~f1.c1.~f3) > f(n)
we can repeat this procedure, until we arrive at a sequence ~c of length at most f(n)
such that ~e1.a . b.~c !b ~e.
Since ~c is obtained from ~e by removing calls, it cannot contain any calls involving
a. We therefore have ~c ∈ C. So it follows from M, (w, ~d) |= Ka
∧
~c∈C [a . b.~c]ϕ that
M, (w′,~e1.a . b.~c) |= ϕ. Then, because ϕ is a modal formula of depth n and the two
states are n-bismilar, we obtain M, (w′,~e) |= ϕ.
In either case of our case distinction, we arrived at M, (w′,~e) |= ϕ. Since this
holds for every (w′,~e) ∼a (w, ~d.a . b), we get M, (w, ~d) |= [a . b]Kaϕ.
Soundness of the axioms for other call types can be shown similarly. Unfortunately,
while this yields a sound and complete axiomatization, the axioms in question are
rather large: we need to consider call sequences of length up to f(n), which is a non-
elementary bound. Specifically, f(0) = 2|P | and f(n+ 1) = 2|P | · 2f(n). It therefore
seems useful to look for a smaller bound.
5.2 A formula-independent bound for most call types
An agent may gain information about another agent’s knowledge of secrets either di-
rectly or indirectly. Direct knowledge is obtained by either telling another agent a
secret, or being told a secret by another agent. If a tells b secret C, then a knows that
b knows C, and likewise b knows that a knows C. Indirect knowledge is obtained by
reasoning about the knowledge of an agent not directly involved in a call. For example,
if the call direction is 3, and a tells b exactly the secrets A and C, then b can conclude
that c knows the secret A.
In order to create our bound, we will look at calls that do not increase the direct
knowledge of either participant.
Definition 5.2. Let a state (w,~c) be given. Agent a has direct knowledge of agent b’s
knowledge of secret C in this state, denoted DKa(FbC), if one of the following three
conditions holds:
1. the sequence ~c contains a call ab or ba where a is a sender, and where a knew
secret C before the call,
2. the sequence ~c contains a call ab or ba where a is a receiver, b knew secret C
before the call and the observance level is β,
3. the sequence ~c contains a call ab or ba where a is a receiver, b knew secret C
before the call and a did not know C before the call.
We abuse notation by treating DKa(FbC) as a formula.
A call ab increases direct knowledge for agent a at a state (w,~c) if there is some
C such that (w,~c) |= ¬DKa(FbC) ∧ [ab]DKa(FbC). A call ab increases direct
knowledge if it increases direct knowledge for either agent.
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When the state is clear from context, we just say that a call increases direct knowl-
edge. The following lemma states a few properties of direct knowledge that will be
important.
Lemma 5.3.
1. If a call does not increase direct knowledge, then no new secrets are learned in
the call.
2. Agents know what their direct knowledge is (i.e., if (w1,~c1) ∼a (w2,~c2) then
for every b and C, w1,~c1 |= DKa(FbC)⇔ w2,~c2 |= DKa(FbC)).
3. If the observance level is β, then a call ab increases the direct knowledge of a if
and only if it increases the direct knowledge of b.




2. A difference in direct knowledge for a between (w1,~c1) and (w2,~c2) would
require there to be a call ab in ~c1 and ~c2 with the property that (i) the set of
secrets sent by a to b differs between the states or (ii) a observes a difference in
the set of secrets received from b between the two states. Either of (i) and (ii)
would be sufficient to conclude (w1,~c1) 6∼a (w2,~c2), so the direct knowledge
of a must be the same in the two states.
3. Suppose that the call ab increases the direct knowledge of a. Then either a sends
b a secret C that was not communicated between the two agents before, or a
observes b’s sending of secret C. In the first case, b observes a’s sending of C, in
the second case b sends a secret C. In either case, b also gains direct knowledge
of a knowing C.
4. Suppose that a3b increases the direct knowledge for either agent. Then there is
some secret C that is being communicated between the two agents for the first
time in this call. So at least one of the agents must have learned C since the last
time (if any) that a and b communicated. If only one of them learned C before
the a3b call, then that agent gains new direct knowledge by sending the new
secret C and the other agent gains new direct knowledge by observing that C is
being sent to them. If both agents learned C before the 3 call, then they both
gain direct knowledge by sending the new secret C.
Corollary 5.4. After any call ab, if the observance is β or the direction is 3, both
agents know whether the call created new direct knowledge.
Proof. The β case follows from points 2 and 3 of Lemma 5.3, the 3 case follows from
points 2 and 4 of the same lemma.
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Using this corollary, we can find our improved bound.
Proposition 5.5. Let τ = ( , d, β) or τ = ( ,3, α). Furthermore, let~c = ~c1.ab.~c2.ab.~c3.ab.~c4
and ~d = ~c1.ab.~c2~c3.ab.~c4. If (w,~c) is such that a and b learn no direct knowledge
about each other during the ~c2.ab.~c3.ab segment, then for every ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free, we have
w,~c |= ϕ if and only if w, ~d |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the construction of ϕ. The extra ab call in ~c did not increase
direct knowledge, so in particular it did not change the set of secrets known to any
agent. So an atomic formula cannot distinguish between (w,~c) and (w, ~d). Suppose
then as induction hypothesis that ϕ is not atomic and that the proposition holds for all
strict subformulas of ϕ.
A Boolean combination of formulas cannot distinguish between two states unless
at least one of the combined formulas does. We can therefore assume without loss of
generality that ϕ if of the form K̂cψ for some agent c.
Suppose c 6∈ {a, b}. The extra ab call does not change the secrets known to any
agent, so for agents not directly involved in the call it is impossible to ever know
whether the call happened. We therefore have (w,~c) ∼c (w, ~d), from which it fol-
lows immediately that K̂cψ does not distinguish between the two states.
Suppose then that c ∈ {a, b}.
• Suppose that w,~c |= K̂cψ. Then there is a state (w′,~c′) ∼c (w,~c) such that
w′,~c′ |= ψ. Because the two states are c-indistinguishable, they must have the














Agents know when they gained direct knowledge, so c did not gain direct knowl-
edge about the other agent in the ~c′2.ab.~c
′
3.ab segment. If a call increases direct
knowledge for one agent it does so for the other agent as well, so the other agent
does not gain direct knowledge about c during ~c′2.ab.~c
′
3.ab either.
The conditions of the proposition are therefore satisfied for (w′,~c′) and (w′, ~d′).
By the induction hypothesis, this implies that w′, ~d′ |= ψ. Note also that the
c-reductions of ~d′ and ~d are the same. So in order for c to distinguish between
(w, ~d) and (w′, ~d′), there would need to be at least one call c in the c-reduction
where c observes different secrets in (w, ~d) and (w′, ~d′). But that is impossible:
the secrets observed by c in c (i) are the same in (w, ~d) and (w,~c), because the
extra ab call did not change the set of secrets known to any agent, (ii) are the
same in (w,~c) and (w′,~c′), because (w,~c) ∼c (w′,~c′) and (iii) are the same in
(w′,~c′) and (w′, ~d′), because the extra ab call did not change the set of secrets
known to any agent. We must therefore have (w′, ~d′) ∼c (w, ~d), and therefore
w, ~d |= K̂cψ.
• Suppose that w, ~d |= K̂cψ. Then there is a state (w′, ~d′) ∼c (w, ~d) such
that w′, ~d′ |= ψ. Because the two states are c-indistinguishable, they must















4, where for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the c-reductions of ~ci and
~c′1 are the same.







From the fact that neither a nor b gained direct knowledge about the other agent
in the~c2.ab.~c3.ab segment of~c, it follows that they did not gain direct knowledge
about each other in the ~c2.~c3.ab either. Furthermore, agents know when they
gained direct knowledge, so c did not gain direct knowledge about the other
agent during ~c′2.~c
′
3.ab. If a call increases direct knowledge for one agent it does
so for the other agent as well, so the other agent does not gain direct knowledge
about c during ~c′2.~c
′
3.ab either.
From the fact that the second call ab in ~d′ did not increase direct knowledge,
it follows that the sender(s) in that call did not gain any new secrets since the
previous ab call. As a result, an extra ab call inserted into the sequence would
not increase direct knowledge for either agent, nor would it change the set of
secrets known to anyone. So the conditions of the proposition are satisfied for ~c′
and ~d′. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that w′,~c′ |= ψ.
Note also that we chose ~c′2 and ~c
′
3 in such a way that the c-reduction of ~c
′ is the
same as that of ~c. Furthermore, by similar reasoning as in the previous case, it
follows that at every call in the c-reduction, the same secrets are observed by c
in the two sequences. So (w,~c) ∼c (w′,~c′). We therefore have w,~c |= K̂cψ.
The above two cases show that K̂cψ does not distinguish between the two states. This
concludes the induction step and thereby the proof.
Corollary 5.6. If τ = ( , d, β) or τ = ( ,3, α), then for every call sequence~c there is
a call sequence~c′ such that (i) for everyw, (w,~c) and (w,~c′) satisfy the same formulas
and (ii) `(~c′) ≤ 2|Ag|3.
Proof. Let ~c′ be the shortest call sequence that satisfies the same formulas as ~c. Take
any two agents a and b, and consider the number of calls ab in ~c′. By Proposition 5.5
and the minimality of~c′, the direct knowledge of a and b about each other must increase
at least every second ab call, since otherwise the proposition would allow us to remove
one call. Note furthermore that any call that increases direct knowledge must do so for
both agents. There are |Ag| different pieces of direct knowledge, one for each secret
C, that a can have about b, another |Ag| pieces that b can have about a. So there can
be at most |Ag| calls ab where direct knowledge increases. There are |Ag|2 different
pairs of agents, so the total number of calls in ~c′ is at most 2|Ag|3.
The general bound shown in the previous subsection shows that for any formula
ϕ, if ϕ true after any number of calls, then it is true after a number of calls that is
exponential in |Ag| and non-elementary in the depth of ϕ. Our improved bound for
( , d, β) and ( ,3, α) is polynomial in |Ag| and independent of ϕ: 2|Ag|3 calls is
enough to for any formula, regardless of the formula’s depth.
5Note that ~c′2 and ~c
′
3 need not be the unique sequences with these properties. For example, if ~c
′
2 = ~e
and ~c′3 = c.~f , where c 6∈ Ag(c), then ~e.c and~f also have the required properties.
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5.3 No formula-independent bound for the remaining call types
For the remaining two call types, ( , ., α) and ( , / , α), we cannot find a bound that
does not depend on ϕ. The following lemma shows that we can construct infinitely
many non-equivalent formulas. This suffices to show that there can be no formula-
independent bound on the length of call sequences that we need to consider.
Lemma 5.7. Let m ≤ n and let ~cmn be a call sequence containing n alternations
a . b, b . a with a single c . a call after m such iterations. Furthermore, let ϕk be given
by ϕ0 = FabC and ϕi+1 = KaKbϕi. Then
• if k ≥ 3(n−m), then ~cmn 6|= ϕk and
• if k < (n−m), then ~cmn |= ϕk.
Proof.
• If m = n, then ~cmn does not result in FabC.
Consider ~cmn with m < n: ~c
m
n =
~dm.c . a.a . b.b . a~dn−m, where ~di contains i
alternations a . b.b . a. In the a . b call, a teaches b the secret C. But there is no
way for a to know whether b already knew C before the call: ~dm.c . a.a . b.b .
a~dn−m ∼a ~dm.c.a.c.b.a.b.b.a~dn−m. Note that in ~dm.c.a.c.b.a.b.b.a~dn−m,
agent b cannot tell whether a tells him C in the call a . b, since he already knows
C by that point (and the observance is α). So ~dm.c . a.c . b.a . b.b . a~dn−m ∼b
~dm.c . b.a . b.b . a~dn−m. In that sequence, a cannot tell whether b learned C
before or after a . b. So ~dm.c . b.a . b.b . a~dn−m ∼a ~dm.a . b.c . b.b . a~dn−m.
In summary, we have the following sequences of indistinguishabilities.
~cmn =
~dm.c . a.a . b.b . a.~dn−m
∼a ~dm.c . a.c . b.a . b.b . a.~dn−m
∼b ~dm.c . b.a . b.b . a.~dn−m
∼a ~dm.a . b.c . b.b . a.~dn−m
∼b ~dm.a . b.c . b.c . a.b . a.~dn−m
∼a ~dm.a . b.c . a.b . a.~dn−m
∼b ~dm.a . b.b . a.c . a.~dn−m
= ~cm+1n
So ~cnn can be reached from ~c
m
n using 3(n−m) iterations of ∼a and ∼b steps. It
follows that for k ≥ 3(n−m), ~cmn 6|= ϕk.
• In a call sequence ~cmn , both agents know when they first learned the secret C.
Agent a is uncertain about when b thinks a learned C, and the other way around,
but that uncertainty about when C was learned can be over at most one iteration
of a . b.b . a. As such, if k < n−m, we have ~cmn |= ϕk.
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Corollary 5.8. If τ = ( , ., α) or τ = ( , / , α), then there are infinitely long se-
quences of calls where no call is redundant.
For these call types, we therefore bound the number of calls using the bisimilarity
argument given in Section 5.1
Remark 5.9. In [5] a number of open questions about gossip problems are introduced.
One of these questions [5, Problem 3] is whether common knowledge reduces to nested
knowledge. That is to say, if we let E∗ stand for common knowledge and E for “every-
body knows”, whether there is a k ∈ N such thatE∗ϕ is equivalent toEkϕ. Lemma 5.7
answer this question in the negative, for the call types ( , ., α) and ( , / , α).
5.4 The Axiomatization
Using the bounds on non-redundant call sequences developed in the preceding subsec-
tions, we can define the privacy and observance axioms for the asynchronous case. We
use two privacy axioms for this case, Pri1( ) and Pri2( ), shown in Table 6.
Privacy Axioms
Pri1( ) [~c]Kaϕ↔ Kaϕ a 6∈ Ag(~c)
Pri2( ) Kaϕ→ Ka[~c]ϕ a 6∈ Ag(~c)
Table 6: Axioms for the the effect of privacy.
Together, the two privacy axioms represent the fact that an agent is completely
unaware of any calls that they are not themselves involved in. The first axiom Pri1( )
states that any calls that a is not involved in do not affect a’s knowledge. After all, if
a 6∈ Ag(~c) then a does not notice any of the calls ~c taking place, so a knows ϕ after ~c
if and only if a already knew ϕ before the call sequence. In other words, if a 6∈ Ag(~c)
then [~c]Kaϕ↔ Kaϕ.
The second privacy axiom Pri2( ) is about an agent a reasoning about possible
calls. For any call sequence ~c not involving a, it is impossible for a to be certain that
~c hasn’t just happened. This means that in in order for a to know for certain that ϕ is
true, a must also know that ϕ will remain true after ~c. In other words, if a 6∈ Ag(~c)
then Kaϕ→ Ka[~c]ϕ.
The observance axioms are a bit more complicated. Here, we use the bounds that
we introduced in the preceding subsections. For n ∈ N, let Ea(n) := {~c | `(~c) ≤
n and ~c ∼a ε}. Furthermore, let f(ϕ) be the number of n-bisimilarity classes, where
n is the depth of ϕ. Then the observance axioms are as shown in Table 7.
If τ = ( , d, o), the proof system Gτ consists of the basic axioms and rules from
Tables 1, 2 and 3, together with the axioms Pri1( ) and Pri2( ) from Table 6 and the
relevant observance axioms from Table 7.
Proposition 5.10. The proof system Gτ is sound for Lτ on the class of all gossip
models for call types τ = ( , d, o).
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Axioms for observance level β for sender (Obss) and receiver (Obsr)
Obss( , ., β) [a . b]Kaϕ↔ Ka
∧
~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3)[a . b.~c]ϕ




~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3) [a . b.~c]ϕ))
Obss( , / , β) [a / b]Kbϕ↔ Kb
∧
~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3) [a / b.~c]ϕ




~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3) [a / b.~c]ϕ))
Obss,r( ,3, β) [a3b]Kcϕ↔
∨
Q,R⊆S(OaQ ∧ObR ∧Kc((OaQ ∧ObR)
→
∧
~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3) [a3b.~c]ϕ)) c ∈ {a, b}
Axioms for observance level α for sender (Obss) and receiver (Obsr)
Obss( , ., α) [a . b]Kaϕ↔ Ka
∧
~c∈Ea(f(ϕ)) [a . b.~c]ϕ




~c∈Ea(f(ϕ)) [a . b.~c]ϕ))
Obss( , / , α) [a / b]Kbϕ↔ Kb
∧
~c∈Ea(f(ϕ)) [a / b.~c]ϕ




~c∈Ea(f(ϕ)) [a / b.~c]ϕ))




~c∈Ea(2|Ag|3) [a3 b.~c]ϕ)) c ∈ {a, b}
Table 7: Axioms about observance.
Proof. The proposition is proven in the same way as Proposition 4.9, except that we
make use of the bounds introduced in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. We therefore do not give
the proof in detail here.
As with the other call types, the proof system Gτ with τ = ( , d, o) has reduction
axioms for the operator [c], so every formula is provably equivalent to a formula of
Lτ[ ]-free.
Theorem 5.11. Let τ = ( , d, o). Then for every formula ϕ ∈ Lτ there is a formula
ψ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free such that `
τ ϕ↔ ψ.
Unlike for the and cases, completeness does not follow immediately. This is
because, unlike the other privacy types, affects which formulas in Lτ[ ]-free are valid.
The formulaKa¬FbC, for example, is not satisfiable for , since a can never be certain
that no call bc or cb has happened. So the basic proof system G is not complete for for
Lτ[ ]-free if τ = ( , d, o).
The solution lies in the axiom Pri2( ). The axiom states that Kaϕ → Ka[~c]ϕ if
a 6∈ Ag(~c2). This allows us to derive, for example, ` ¬Ka¬FbC, in the following
way. First, using the appropriate effect axiom, we have ` ¬[c]¬FbC, where c = bc
or c = cb, depending on the direction type. Then, using the contrapositive of T, we
get ` ¬Ka[c]¬FbC. Finally, using the contrapositive of Pri2( ), we conclude that
` ¬Ka¬FbC. For every Lτ[ ]-free formula that is not satisfiable for privacy type , a
similar proof exists.
Lemma 5.12. Let τ = ( , d, o). Then Gτ is sound and strongly complete for Lτ[ ]-free
on the class of all gossip models.
34
Completeness then follows immediately from Theorem 5.11 and Lemma 5.12.
Corollary 5.13. The proof system Gτ is strongly complete for Lτ on the class of all
gossip models for call type τ = ( , d, o).
Together with Proposition 5.10, this yields the soundness and completeness that we
desire.
Theorem 5.14. The proof system Gτ is sound and strongly complete for Lτ on the
class of all gossip models for call type τ = ( , d, o).
6 Axiomatisation: the Tree Model
The proof system Gτ is sound and complete with respect to the class of all gossip
models. Unlike most other modal logics, however, our gossip logic has a single model
that is of particular importance, namely the tree model. The axiomatizations that we
introduced in the preceding sections are sound and complete for the class of all gossip
models. So while those axiomatizations are interesting, we would additionally like to
have axiomatizations that are sound and complete for the tree model specifically. We
will do so by adding extra rules.
Recall that the axiomatization Gτ reduces every formula to a call-free one. So
it suffices to make our axiomatizations complete for Lτ[ ]-free with respect to the tree
model. For the synchronous call types and this is relatively easy.
In the origin world of the tree models for ( , d, o) and ( , d, o) it is common knowl-
edge among all agents that everyone only knows their own secret. The gossip states of
the tree model are exactly those states that can be reached by some sequence of calls
from this origin world.
Our language cannot express common knowledge, but we can express approxima-
tions of common knowledge. Recall that root was defined as an abbreviation for the
situation where every agents knows only their own secret. For n ∈ N, we can then
define rootn recursively by
root0 := root





We can then show that if ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free is of depth at most n, then root
n is a sufficiently
close approximation of the tree model.
Lemma 6.1. Let (w,~c) be a gossip state such that (w,~c) |= rootn, and let ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free
be a formula of depth at most n. Then for any call sequence ~d, we have (w,~c) |= [~d]ϕ
if and only if (wroot , ε) |= [~d]ϕ.
Proof. If (w,~c) |= rootn, then (w,~c) !n (wroot , ε). The lemma follows immedi-
ately from the facts that n-bisimilarity is preserved under calls and that truth of ϕ is
preserved under n-bisimilarity.
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A formula is satisfiable in the tree model if and only if there is some ~d such that
(wroot , ε) |= [~d]ϕ. So, by the above lemma, ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there is
some ~d such that |= rootn → [~d]ϕ. The next step is to bound the length of the call
sequence necessary to achieve ϕ if it is satisfiable. The general bound that we used
in the preceding sections is still applicable, every satisfiable formula of depth n is
satisfiable after a call sequence of length at most equal to the number of n-bisimilarity
classes. But for some variants we can find better bounds.
First, consider the privacy type . As discussed in Section 3, the tree model with
that privacy type satisfies ϕ ↔ Kaϕ for every a. This implies that, in the tree model,
two states cannot be distinguishable (by any formula) unless the are distinguishable by
some atomic formula FaB. The necessary number of calls to achieve any formula is
therefore limited by the number of such atoms, i.e., by |Ag|2.
Definition 6.2. If τ = ( , d, o), then the proof system Gτtree consist of all rules and
axioms of Gτ plus the rule Tree( ) given by
if ` rootn → [~c]ϕ for all ~c such that `(~c) ≤ |Ag|2 then ` ϕ
where n is the depth of ϕ.
Theorem 6.3. If τ = ( , d, o), then Gτtree is sound and strongly complete for the tree
model.
For privacy type , knowledge does not reduce to truth, i.e., Kaϕ is not equivalent
to ϕ. The bound |Ag|2 therefore fails, so we use the fallback option of bounding the
call sequence length using the number of n-bisimilarity classes.
Definition 6.4. If τ = ( , d, o), then the proof system Gτtree consists of all rules and
axioms of Gτ plus the rule Tree( ) given by
if ` rootn → [~c]ϕ for all ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m then ` ϕ
where n is the depth of ϕ and m is the number of n-bisimilarity equivalence classes.
Theorem 6.5. If τ = ( , d, o), then Gτtree is sound and strongly complete for the tree
model.
This leaves us with the asynchronous privacy type . In that type, common knowl-
edge of root is impossible; even in the world wroot the agents consider it possible that
root is no longer true due to some call they were not involved in.
What we can do, is make use of the fact that the tree model only has one origin
world wroot , so every state is of the form (wroot ,~c) for some ~c. The following propo-
sition makes use of this property.
Definition 6.6. The rules Tree1( ), Tree2( ) and Tree3( ) are given by
Tree∞1 ( ) If ` root → [~c]ϕ for all (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d),
then ` root → [~d]Kaϕ.
Tree∞2 ( ) If ` root → [~c]ϕ for some (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d),
then ` root → [~d]K̂aϕ.
Tree∞3 ( ) If ` root → [~c]ϕ for all ~c, then ` ϕ.
36
Proposition 6.7. The rules Tree∞1 ( ), Tree
∞
2 ( ) and Tree
∞
3 ( ) are sound with
respect to the tree model.
Proof. Soundness of the three rules follows from two facts: firstly, in the tree model
there is only one world, namely wroot , and, secondly, (wroot , ε) is the only state where
root holds. So suppose that |=tree root → [~c]ϕ for all (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d).
Then (wroot , ε) |= [~c]ϕ for all such ~c and therefore (wroot ,~c) |= ϕ for all ~c such that
(wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d). Because wroot is the only world in this model, those are
all the states that are a-indistinguishable from (wroot , ~d) so (wroot , ~d) |= Kaϕ and
therefore (wroot , ε) |= [~d]Kaϕ. Because (wroot , ε) is the only state where root holds,
this implies that |=tree root → [~d]Kaϕ. We have now shown that Tree∞1 ( ) preserves
validity, so it is sound.
Similarly, suppose that |= root → [~c]ϕ for some (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d). Then
(wroot ,~c) |= ϕ which, because of how ~c was chosen, implies that (wroot , ~d) |= K̂aϕ
and therefore (wroot , ε) |= [~d]K̂aϕ. Again using the fact that (wroot , ε) is the only
states where root is satisfied, we obtain |= root → [~d]K̂aϕ. So the rule Tree∞2 ( )
also preserves validity, and is therefore sound.
Finally, soundness of root → [~c]ϕ follows from the fact that every state in the
tree model is of the form (wroot ,~c), so if ¬ϕ were to hold in any state we would have
6|=tree root → [~c]ϕ for the appropriate call sequence ~c.
While sound, the rules Tree∞1 ( ), Tree
∞
2 ( ) and Tree
∞
3 ( ) are not suitable for
use in a recursive axiomatization, because they are infinitary, i.e., they have an infi-
nite number of premises. Fortunately, the bounds that we introduced in the preceding
sections still apply. We therefore define finitary variants of the three Tree rules as
follows.
Definition 6.8. For m ∈ N, let the rules Treem1 ( ), Tree
m
2 ( ) and Tree
m
3 ( ) be
given by
Treem1 ( ) if ` root → [~c]ϕ for all ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m · (`(~d) + 1)
and (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d) then ` root → [~d]Kaϕ
Treem1 ( ) if ` root → [~c]ϕ for some ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m · (`(~d) + 1)
and (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d) then ` root → [~d]K̂aϕ
Treem3 ( ) if ` root → [~c]ϕ for all ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m then ` ϕ
If τ = ( ,3, o) or τ = ( , d, β), let Gτtree consist of the proof system G
τ plus the rules
Tree
2|Ag|3
1 ( ), Tree
2|Ag|3
2 ( ) and Tree
2|Ag|3
3 ( ).
If τ = ( , ., α) or τ = ( , / , α), let Gτtree consist of the proof system G
τ plus
the rules Treef(ϕ)1 ( ), Tree
f(ϕ)
2 ( ) and Tree
f(ϕ)
3 ( ), where f(ϕ) is the number of
n-bisimilarity equivalence classes and n is the depth of ϕ.
Theorem 6.9. If τ = ( , d, o) then Gτtree is sound and strongly complete for the tree
model.
Proof. First, let use prove that the rules are sound. Using the bounds introduced in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we can see that the premises of Tree∞i ( ) (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
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are satisfied if and only if the premises of Treemi ( ) are. By Proposition 6.7 it then
follows that Gτtree is sound for the tree model.
We continue by showing that Gτtree is complete for the tree model. We start by
showing that if |=tree root → [~d]ϕ, then ` root → [~d]ϕ. Since every formula is
provably equivalent to a Lτ[ ]-free formula, we can assume without loss of generality that
ϕ ∈ Lτ[ ]-free.
As base case, suppose that ϕ is a Boolean formula. Then root → [~d]ϕ is already
provable in Gτ , so in particular it is provable in Gτtree . Suppose then as induction
hypothesis that the claim holds for all subformulas of ϕ. We continue by a case dis-
tinction on the main connective of ϕ, which we can assume without loss of generality
to be Ka, K̂a, ∨ or ∧.
First, suppose that ϕ = Kaψ, so |=tree root → [~d]Kaψ. Then (wroot , ε) |=
[~d]Kaψ and therefore (wroot , ~d) |= Kaψ. It then follows that (wroot ,~c) |= ψ for all
(wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d). That, in turn, implies that (wroot , ε) |= [~c]ψ for all such
~c. Because (wroot , ε) is the only state in the tree model where root holds, we get
|=tree root → [~c]ψ for all ~c such that (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d). By the induction
hypothesis, we obtain ` root → [~c]ϕ for all such ~c. In particular, this means that
` root → [~c]ϕ for every~c such that `(~c) ≤ m·(`(~d)+1) and (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d),
which by Treem1 ( ) yields ` root → [~d]Kaϕ.
Secondly, suppose that ϕ = K̂aψ, so |=tree root → [~d]K̂aψ. Then (wroot , ~d) |=
K̂aψ and therefore (wroot ,~c) |= ψ for some (wroot ,~c) ∼a (wroot , ~d). Furthermore,
we can choose this ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m · (`(~d) + 1). This implies that |=tree root →
[~c]ψ and therefore, by the induction hypothesis, ` root → [~c]ψ. The rule Treem2 ( )
then yields ` root → [~d]K̂aϕ.
Thirdly, suppose that ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, so |=tree root → [~d](ψ1 ∧ ψ2). Then |=tree
root → [~d]ψ1 and |=tree root → [~d]ψ2, so by the induction hypothesis ` root →
[~d]ψ1 and ` root → [~d]ψ2. It follows that ` root → [~d](ψ1 ∧ ψ2).
Finally, suppose that ϕ = ψ1∨ψ2, so |=tree root → [~d](ψ1∨ψ2). This implies that
(wroot , ε) |= [~d](ψ1 ∨ ψ2), which is equivalent to (wroot , ε) |= [~d]ψ1 or (wroot , ε) |=
[~d]ψ2. Using the fact that (root , ε) is the only state in the rooted model where root
holds, it follows that |=tree root → [~d]ψ1 or |=tree root → [~d]ψ2. By the induction
hypothesis this yields ` root → [~d]ψ1 or ` root → [~d]ψ2, either of which can be used
to obtain ` root → [~d](ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
This completes the proof that if |=tree root → [~d]ϕ then ` root → [~d]ϕ. Now,
all that is left to do is to note that if |=tree ϕ then |=tree root → [~c]ϕ for every ~c. We
have already shown that this implies that ` root → [~c]ϕ for every ~c, and therefore in
particular for ever ~c such that `(~c) ≤ m. Using Treem3 ( ), this gives us ` ϕ.
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7 Conclusion
Conclusion The epistemic gossip problem is a formal model of peer-to-peer com-
munication, with so-called calls representing the communication itself and secrets rep-
resenting the information that is exchanged. Different kinds of communication lead
to slightly different models. This means that there are many different variants of the
gossip problem, one for each possible way in which peer-to-peer communication can
happen.
In this paper, we considered a large number of variants of the gossip problem, that
differ on the extent to which communication is private (full observance, synchronous
or asynchronous), the direction of information transfer (caller to callee, callee to caller,
or both) and what information the agents gain about the set of secrets known by their
communication partner (all secrets or only new secrets). We gave formal semantics
for each of these variants, compared their properties, showed their model and validity
checking problems to be decidable and introduced sound and complete axiomatiza-
tions for each of them. Importantly, the axiomatizations are reduction systems: every
formula involving calls can be reduced to an equivalent formula that does not involve
calls. This required proving bounds on the number of non-redundant calls in arbitrary
sequences. Such bounds sometimes depend on the knowledge conditions that should
hold after the execution of such sequences.
Our results that the logics are decidable imply that the termination of gossip pro-
tocols under all of the investigated variations is also decidable. Likewise, it is de-
cidable whether a gossip protocol is successful, i.e., whether all agents will know all
secrets once the protocol terminates. This is not immediately obvious, as gossip pro-
tocols allowing infinite call sequences cannot be formalized in our logical language.
However, using our results for redundancy (with the direct knowledge bound where
it is applicable and the n-bisimilarity bound in the two cases where the direct knowl-
edge bound does not apply), we can identify any gossip protocol P with the finite
set CP of its maximal non-redundant execution sequences. Termination then reduces








Complexity and redundancy We showed that, in general, every formula ϕ of depth
n that is satisfied after any call sequence is satisfied after a call sequence of length at
most f(n), where f(n) is the number of n-bisimilarity classes. For certain variants,
we also proved that there is a constant bound, i.e., one that does not depend on ϕ.
Specifically, for ( ,3, o) and ( , d, β) we showed that a constant bound of 2|Ag|3
suffices. For the variants ( , ., α) and ( , / , α) we showed that such a constant bound
does not exist. For the observable case ( , d, o) it is easy to see that a constant bound
of |Ag|2 suffices. This leaves only the synchronous privacy cases ( , d, o). For those,
existence of a constant bound is still an open question. Furthermore, for the cases
where a constant bound exists it is not currently known whether the above bounds are
tight.
We have used these bounds on the length of non-redundant call sequences to show
that the model checking, tree validity checking and validity checking problems for all
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variants of the gossip problem are decidable. Our decidability proofs are effective, in
the sense that they prove decidability by providing a method for deciding them. We
can therefore also find upper bounds of the complexity of the decision problems for
each variant. Unfortunately, these bounds are rather high.
We can determine whetherM(I), (w,~c) |= ϕ by first using the bound on the length
of non-redundant call sequences to create a finite approximation of M(I), and then
using standard model checking techniques for modal logic to check whether ϕ holds
in the approximation of M(I). Determining whether |=tree ϕ can likewise be done by
finding a finite approximation of Mtree and using standard model checking techniques
to determine whether ϕ holds in that approximation. A simple, if rather naive, way to
check whether |= ϕ is to construct one initial model I per n-bisimilarity class, and then
to check whether ϕ holds on each M(I).
The constant bounds on the length of non-redundant call sequences are polynomial.
In the variants of the gossip problem where these bound applies there are therefore
at most exponentially many different non-redundant call sequences. The complexity
of model checking and tree-validity checking for those variants is therefore at most
exponential. In the variants of where the constant bounds do not apply we instead use
the n-bisimilarity bound. That bound is non-elementary, however, so the bound on
the complexity of model checking and tree validity checking for those variants is also
non-elementary. Since we construct one initial model I for each n-bisimilarity class,
the complexity bound on validity checking is non-elementary in every variant of the
gossip problem.
None of these upper bounds have been shown to be tight. In fact, we suspect that
most of them are not tight. Establishing tight upper bounds for the complexity of these
decisions problems seems like an interesting avenue for future research.
Epistemic planning The relation between gossip protocols and epistemic planning
was addressed in the already mentioned [16]. It seems to us that different gossip sce-
narios may possibly make for interesting case studies in epistemic planning, as their
very restricted parameters allow for decidability in settings where general epistemic
planning is undecidable. This may be in the context of temporal epistemic planning (as
evidenced for gossip in the above [16] and also in the subsequent [18]) as well as in the
context of dynamic epistemic planning.
Undecidability of epistemic planning has been a strong focus of recent research
and has been obtained for very different settings [12, 8, 29, 15]. Among the sources of
undecidability in epistemic planning are uncertainty about the actual action (observa-
tion) and thus unbounded (namely continuously expanding) model size while executing
plans ([8]), but also the unrestricted modal depth of preconditions for plan execution,
both for S5 ([15]) and for KD45 ([29]), resulting in unbounded models for another
reason.
As in those more general kinds of epistemic planning, planning for gossip suffers
from unbounded model size. What saves gossip planning from being undecidable is
that both the effect of actions (calls) and the agents’ ability to observe actions is highly
structured and predictable. This is what allows us to reduce the unbounded models to
finite approximations of those models, resulting in decidability.
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